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THE TAIL WAGS THE DOG: JUDICIAL
MISINTERPRETATION OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
BAN IN THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
JEFF L. LEWIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1946, the United States waived its sovereign immunity by en-
acting the Federal Tort Claims Act' (FTCA). Through the FTCA,
the United States made itself liable for the torts of its employees
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individ-
ual under like circumstances." 2 The FTCA provides that all
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gan; J.D., 1975, Harvard University.
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death actions under the FTCA.
Research support was provided by the Arthur B. Hodges Educational Trust of the West
Virginia University College of Law.
1. Ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346(b)-(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-2680 (1982)).
2. Originally, the pertinent provision of the FTCA provided: "[T]he United States shall
be liable in respect of such claims to the same claimants, in the same manner, and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except that the United States
shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment, or for punitive damages." Id. § 410(a), 60
Stat. at 844. As amended and codified, this section now provides: "The United States shall
be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be
liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
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liability and damage issues must be determined in accordance with
state law,3 but it bans recovery of prejudgment interest or punitive
damages against the United States.4
On its face, the FTCA's ban on punitive damages appears clear
and noncontroversial. Punitive or exemplary damages are sanc-
tions that may be imposed to punish a particular defendant for
willful or wanton misconduct and to deter similar misconduct by
others.5 Under the FTCA's punitive damages ban, district courts
may award whatever damages will provide appropriate and full
compensation under state law, but they may not award additional
amounts to punish aggravated misconduct.
Recently, however, several federal circuit courts have substan-
tially broadened the scope of the punitive damages ban by using a
novel and indirect definition of "punitive damages." Presuming
that all damages must be either compensatory or punitive, these
courts have approached each case by first determining the amount
of damages needed to compensate the plaintiff's "actual loss," and
then defining any additional damages permitted under state law as
3. Originally, the FTCA provided:
[T]he United States district court for the district wherein the plaintiff is resi-
dent or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim
against the United States, for money only ... on account of damage to or loss
of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such
damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 812, 843-44 (1946) (emphasis
added). As amended and codified, this section now provides:
[T]he district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of prop-
erty, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (emphasis added); see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1962); Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956).
4. See supra note 2.
5. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979); see infra notes 14-18 and accompanying
text.
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noncompensatory, punitive damages.' Employing this approach,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ap-
plied the punitive damages ban in several cases to invalidate
awards because the applicable state law did not discount lost earn-
ings awards to present value7 or reduce awards to after-tax earn-
ings by deducting projected tax liability." The United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit also has used this approach to in-
validate an award because the applicable state law gave the benefi-
ciaries in a wrongful death action more than they would have re-
ceived from the decedent if he had survived.9 Finally, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, interpreting the
ban similarly, has reversed an award to a semi-comatose plaintiff
for "loss of enjoyment of life" because the money could not console
or benefit the unconscious plaintiff.10
By indirectly defining punitive damages as any damages that are
not compensatory, these courts in effect have created a federal
measure of damages even though the FTCA requires courts to de-
termine damages using state law. Recognizing the slippery slope
inherent in judicial expansion of the punitive damages ban, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has expressly
rejected this approach.1" A panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit also has repudiated this approach,1 2 al-
though it continues to adhere to earlier opinions in which it invali-
dated lost earnings awards that were not reduced to after-tax
earnings and discounted to present value.1 3
This Article argues against an expansive reading of the FTCA's
ban on punitive damages. More specifically, the Article challenges
the approach of certain federal courts that define punitive damages
6. See infra notes 143-272 and accompanying text.
7. See Hollinger v. United States, 651 F.2d 636, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1981).
8. See Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1984); Hollinger v. United
States, 651 F.2d 636, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1981); Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 670 (9th
Cir. 1976).
9. See D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075
(1973).
10. Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1226 (1984).
11. See Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1978).
12. See Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984).
13. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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as any award exceeding their own conception of full compensation.
Their approach necessarily presupposes a federal measure of com-
pensatory damages, while the FTCA expressly requires courts to
determine the extent of damages using state law. The expansive
application of the punitive damages exclusion urged by these fed-
eral courts results in a definition of "punitive damages" that con-
tradicts the plain meaning of the term, and it produces results that
conflict with the expressed intent of Congress that a plaintiff in-
jured by a federal employee should receive the same compensation
as a plaintiff injured by a private defendant.
The Article begins with an inquiry into the meaning of the puni-
tive damages ban, analyzing the statutory language and examining
in detail the legislative history of the FTCA and a subsequent
amendment. Next, drawing upon the legislative history, the Article
explores the role of state law in interpreting the meaning of "puni-
tive damages." Finally, the Article studies the reasoning of federal
courts that have broadly defined "punitive damages" as any award
in excess of a plaintiff's "actual loss," concluding that their ap-
proach is inconsistent with the language of the FTCA and the leg-
islative history. Although the FTCA clearly mandates application
of state law in measuring damages against the government, these
courts define "punitive damages" as as any award exceeding a
plaintiff's loss, as measured by federal law instead of state law,
thereby letting the "tail" of the punitive damages ban wag the
"dog" of compensatory damage determination under the FTCA.
H. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF "PUNITIVE DAMAGES" UNDER
THE FTCA
A. The Statutory Language
Any attempt at statutory interpretation must begin with the lan-
guage of the statute itself. The FTCA is no exception. In interpret-
ing the FTCA, the Supreme Court has stated: "[W]e must, of
course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. ' 14 According
14. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
[Vol. 27:245
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to the Court, the provisions of the FTCA must be interpreted in
light of "their plain natural meaning.""
What is the "ordinary" and "natural" meaning of "punitive
damages" as used in the FTCA's punitive damages proscription?
"Punitive damages" generally have been defined as damages
awarded separately in cases of willful or wanton misconduct, in ad-
dition to compensation for a plaintiff's actual loss, to vindicate the
plaintiff, to punish the defendant, and to deter others from acting
similarly. 16 This well-established and unambiguous definition of
"punitive damages" has not changed significantly since well before
the enactment of the FTCA.17  The two distinguishing
15. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957).
16. At the time Congress enacted the FTCA, Black's Law Dictionary defined "exemplary
damages," a term synonymous with "punitive damages," as
damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and above what
will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done to him
was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wan-
ton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to
solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degra-
dation, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the de-
fendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him, for which reason
they are also called "punitive" or "punitory" damages or "vindictive" damages,
and (vulgarly) "smart-money."
BLACK'S LAW DiCTioNARY 501 (3d ed. 1933).
17. Compare 17 C.J. Damages §§ 40, 268, 279-284 (1919) and supra note 16 and C. Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275-82 (1935) and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 908 & comments a, b (1939) with BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 467-68 (4th ed. 1951) and 25
C.J.S. Damages §§ 117(1), 123 (1966) and RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 908 & com-
ments a, b (1977) and BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979).
The stability in the definition of "punitive damages" also is demonstrated by the consis-
tency of Supreme Court damages doctrine. Both before and after the FTCA was enacted,
the Court recognized that punitive damages are appropriate only in cases involving willful
or wanton misconduct and that their purpose is to punish and to deter that misconduct.
Compare Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86-89 (1896) (intentional and malicious misconduct
would sustain award of exemplary damages) and Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S.
489, 492-95 (1875) ("gross negligence" would not justify award of exemplary damages; "will-
ful misconduct" or "conscious indifference" is required) and Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v.
Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 213-14 (1858) (instruction concerning exemplary damages
was error when plaintiff introduced no evidence of malice) and Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (describing nature and purpose of exemplary damages)
with Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 47-48 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Punitive]
damages are typically determined by reference to factors such as the character of the wrong,
the amount necessary to 'punish' the defendant, etc.") and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
257 n.11 (1978) (punitive damages might be available in § 1983 actions for "specific purpose
of deterring or punishing," but no basis for such an award exists without "malicious
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characteristics of punitive damages are that they are appropriate
only in cases involving willful or wanton misconduct and that their
purpose is to punish and to deter such misconduct.
The FTCA was drafted by representatives of the Department of
Justice under the direction of the Attorney General.' s Undoubt-
edly, these individuals understood the legal significance and pre-
vailing meaning of "punitive damages." This prevailing meaning,
therefore, should be considered the "ordinary" and "natural"
meaning of "punitive damages" as it appears in the FTCA.
B. Legislative History
The clear and unambiguous meaning of "punitive damages" or-
dinarily would obviate the need to examine the FTCA's legislative
history for further explication. Such analysis is essential, however,
because the authorities advocating a broad definition of "punitive
damages" under the FTCA have purported to rely upon its legisla-
tive history.19
The legislative history of the FTCA includes not only materials
relating to the FTCA itself, but also materials relating to various
bills concerning tort claims against the government that had been
introduced during the twenty years preceding the FTCA's enact-
ment. 0 As a general rule, the thoughts expressed by members of
earlier Congresses are not probative of the intentions of the Con-
gress that finally enacted a piece of legislation. The FTCA is an
exception to this rule, however, for three reasons. First, Congress
enacted the FTCA as Title IV of the comprehensive Legislative
intention") and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159-61 (1967) (plurality opin-
ion) (malice sufficient to impose liability for libel also justifies award of punitive damages).
18. See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings]; id. at 11 (letter of Att'y Gen. Robert H. Jackson); H.R. REP. No. 2428,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940) (identical letter from Att'y Gen. Jackson). This hearing, and
the related report, concern H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), the predecessor of the
FTCA that first contained a provision barring recovery of punitive damages.
19. See, e.g., Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 667-69 (9th Cir. 1976); D'Ambra v.
United States, 481 F.2d 14, 16-17 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); Comment,
Defining Punitive Damages Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 53 U. CIN. L. RE v. 251
(1984).
20. A nearly complete listing of the bills preceeding the FTCA appears in Gottlieb, The
Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1, 2-4 nn.4 & 5 (1946).
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Reorganization Act of 1946.21 As only part of a larger bill, the
FTCA received relatively little attention in the congressional de-
bate.22 The information that does exist indicates that Congress
deemed the history of earlier bills to be part of the legislative his-
tory of the FTCA. In discussing Title IV, the report of the Senate
Special Committee on the Organization of Congress 23 referred to,
and quoted at length from, the committee report on a House bill
concerning federal tort claims2' which, in turn, referred to the his-
tory of earlier tort claims bills and to previous congressional hear-
ings.25 Second, Congressman Emanuel Celler was a member of the
relevant House committees between 1926 and 1946. Because he
was influential in shaping the final version of the FTCA,26 his anal-
ysis and criticism of the previous proposals are relevant insofar as
they were reflected in the subsequent revisions. Third, the various
tort claims bills introduced during this same period manifest an
evolution in their underlying philosophy and purpose. These evolu-
tionary trends bear directly on the interpretation of the punitive
damages ban. As a result, the punitive damages ban can be under-
stood fully only after examination of the entire legislative history
of the FTCA.
21. See supra note 1.
22. See Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YAx L.J. 534, 536 n.10 (1947).
23. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
24. Id. at 30-31 (referring to HR. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
26. As a member of the Committee on Claims in 1926, Congressman Celler submitted a
supplementary report to each of two committee reports, in which he claimed that the pro-
posed tort claims bills were inadequate. See HR REP. No. 667, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-14
(1926) (concerning S. 1912); HR. REP. No. 206, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-14 (1926) (concerning
H.R. 8651). Congressman Celler subsequently introduced a series of bills that eventually
resulted in enactment of the FTCA. See H.R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 1356,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 817, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 6463, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1942); H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1941); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1939). Congressman Celler also authored reports for the Judiciary Committee to support
several predecessors of the FTCA. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) (concern-
ing S. 2221); H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (concerning H.R. 181); HR.
REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (concerning H.R. 7236). Perhaps most impor-
tantly, Congressman Celler assisted the Attorney General in preparing several crucial
amendments to H.R. 5373 that were reflected both in H.R. 6463 and in the final version of
the FTCA. See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sass. 1 (1942) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
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1. Early Predecessors of the FTCA
The history of the FTCA began in the middle of the nineteenth
century, when claims against the government were precluded by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 7 Persons with claims against
the United States could secure redress only through private bills.
Because the increasing volume of private bills had become a sub-
stantial burden, and because Congress wanted to afford justice to
persons doing business with the government,28 Congress passed
legislation in 1855 establishing the United States Court of
Claims.29 Once its authority was extended fully,30 the Court of
Claims was empowered to hear claims against the United States
founded either upon contract or upon any law expressly allowing
suit against the United States.31 Its authority, however, was limited
expressly to cases "not sounding in tort. '3 2 Later, Congress created
exceptions to the ban on tort cases for patent infringement suits,33
27. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1846); Shimomura, The His-
tory of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution From a Legislative Toward a
Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 666 & n.343 (1985).
28. Congressional criticism of the private claims bill procedure is collected in House
Hearings, supra note 26, at 49-55 and in Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 5-6.
29. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
30. Originally, the Court of Claims had no authority to enter judgment. It only could
submit findings, opinions, and recommendations to Congress along with proposed bills for
congressional enactment. In 1863 and 1866, however, Congress reorganized the court and
gave it the power to render judgments. Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9; Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. The Court of Claims still lacked the power to enforce its judg-
ments against the property of the United States. This limitation created substantial uncer-
tainty concerning the status of that court under Article III of the Constitution. See
Shimomura, supra note 27, at 651-52.
Congress further extended judicial power to hear claims against the government in 1887
in the Tucker Act. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. The Tucker Act expanded
jurisdiction in cases against the government beyond contract cases to admiralty, tax, pay,
and "takings" cases. Shimomura, supra note 27, at 664. On the other hand, the Tucker Act
added language that expressly restricted jurisdiction to "cases not sounding in tort." The
Act also gave "district courts" of the United States concurrent jurisdiction over claims up to
$1000 and gave "circuit courts" concurrent jurisdiction over claims up to $10,000. Act of
Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 357, 24 Stat. 505.
31. See supra note 30.
32. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505; see supra note 30. One commentator has
asserted that this provision was phrased ambiguously, and that district and circuit courts
could have read the Tucker Act as allowing certain tort claims until the Supreme Court
ruled otherwise. See Note, supra note 22, at 534 n.5.
33. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851.
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as well as for certain admiralty and maritime torts. 4 For ordinary
torts, however, the general ban remained in effect into the twenti-
eth century, and the sole recourse of claimants continued to be the
enactment of private bills.
A portion of the burden of private tort claims legislation was re-
lieved by enactment of the Small Claims Act of 1922.35 This legis-
lation authorized the various departments of the federal govern-
ment "to consider, ascertain, adjust, and determine" claims up to
$1000 for damage to property caused by the negligence of any of-
ficer or employee of the United States.3 Congress limited the
Small Claims Act to settlement of claims for property damage,
however, and made no provision for redress of personal injuries.37
Based upon legislation introduced in the previous Congress,38
Congress in 1929 passed a bill which would have increased the
34. Act of Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 428, 43 Stat. 1112; Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525.
35. Act of Dec. 28, 1922, ch. 17, 42 Stat. 1066. The bill's author was Congressman Un-
derhill, a member of the Committee on Claims and a stalwart proponent of federal tort
claims legislation.
36. Id. At the time of its passage, the House Committee on Claims estimated that the
Small Claims Act would dispose of nearly one-third of the approximately 1000 private bills
filed with the Committee each year. H.R. REP. No. 342, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1921).
37. See Act of Dec. 28, 1922, ch. 17, 42 Stat. 1066.
38. In 1925, the Senate passed S. 1912, which would have increased the settlement au-
thority of federal departments to $5000 in property damage cases and would have allowed
suits in federal courts for property damage up to $50,000. S. 1912, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1925) (printed as amended in 67 CONG. REc. 5605 (1926)). The bill also would have pro-
vided for personal injury claimants. Although the bill would not have afforded these claim-
ants a right to bring suit, it would have allowed them to fie claims for personal injuries or
death with the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, which administered
the workers' compensation program for federal employees. See Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458,
39 Stat. 742. The bill would have directed the Commission "to consider, ascertain, adjust,
and determine" the claim, and to certify it for payment by Congress. The bill originally had
set a maximum award of $5000 for personal injury and death claims, but this ceiling was
reduced to $3000 prior to Senate passage. S. 1912, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1925) (printed
as amended in 67 CONG. REc. 5605 (1926)). The Senate's amendment and passage of the bill
are reported at 67 CONG. REC. 5607 (1926).
While the Senate was acting on S. 1912, the House was considering similar legislation.
H.R. 8651, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925). The House bill followed the Senate bill in its treat-
ment of property damage claims, increasing the settlement authority of federal departments
to $5000 and allowing suits in the federal courts for amounts exceeding that limit, up to
$50,000. See H.R. REP. No. 206, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1926). With regard to personal
injury claims, however, H.R. 8651 contained a fixed compensation schedule of weekly pay-
ments for death or disability, with ceilings of $5000 for general claims, $300 for medical,
surgical, and hospital services and supplies, and $200 for funeral expenses. See id. This
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settlement authority of the departments to $5000 for property
damage and would have allowed suits in the federal courts for
property damage up to $50,000. The bill included a separate provi-
sion for administrative processing of claims for personal injuries up
to a ceiling of $7500, plus medical and funeral expenses.3 9 This bill
received a pocket veto from President Coolidge. 0
A new version of the vetoed legislation was introduced later in
1929, during the next Congress. 41 Legislation introduced later in
compensation schedule was virtually identical to the schedule in the workers' compensation
program administered by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission.
Following the Senate's passage of S. 1912, the House quickly considered its own version of
the Senate bill. Although this House version bore the same number as the Senate bill, it
incorporated many of the features of H.R. 8651. See H.R. REP. No. 667, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
3-7 (1926) (digesting the House version of S. 1912). For example, this version included per-
sonal injury provisions modeled on the United States Employees' Compensation Act, al-
though it eliminated the detailed compensation schedule based on that Act that had been
set forth in H.R. 8651. The House quickly passed the amended version of S.1912, 67 CONG.
REC. 11,110 (1926), but the Senate did not act favorably on the revised version. See House
Hearings, supra note 26, at 41 n.17.
39. H.R. 9285, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927) (printed as amended in 69 CONG. REc. 4837
(1929)). This bill passed the House in 1928, 69 CONG. REc. 3179 (1928), and passed the
Senate in 1929, 69 CONG. REC. 4839 (1929). H.R. 9285 contained the same provisions as S.
1912 regarding property damage claims, allowing administrative adjustment of claims up to
$5000 and federal court jurisdiction over claims up to $50,000. The personal injury provi-
sions also were similar to S. 1912, but the bill raised the ceiling for these claims to $7500
plus medical and funeral expenses. Id.
With regard to the compensation provisions of H.R. 9285, the bill's sponsor said, "The
phraseology of this section of the bill is taken literally, verbatim, word for word, and punc-
tuatam from the regular Federal compensation law." 69 CONG. REC. 3128 (1928) (statement
of Rep. Underhill); see HR. REP. No. 286, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1928). The bill, however,
did not contain the detailed compensation schedule set forth in the House bill in the previ-
ous Congress. See supra note 38. After a Senate amendment, the bill also departed from
earlier proposals because, instead of requiring the Commission to certify claims directly to
Congress, the bill required the United States Employees' Compensation Commission to cer-
tify claims to the General Accounting Office, where the Comptroller General would audit
and settle the claims. See S. REP. No. 1699, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1929).
40. 70 CONG. REc. index, at 295 (1929). The ostensible reason for President Coolidge's
veto was that attorneys from the Comptroller General's office, rather than from the Attor-
ney General's office, were to defend appeals from the Comptroller General's settlements on
writ of certiorari to the Court of Claims. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 41; H.R.
REP. No. 2800, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1931); 72 CONG. REc. 9867-68 (1930) (statement of
Sen. Howell); Shimomura, supra note 27, at 680 n.451.
41. S. 4377, 71st Cong., 2d Seas. (1929) (printed as amended in 74 CONG. REc. 85 (1930)).
S. 4377 still provided for administrative evaluation of personal injury claims by the United
States Employees' Compensation Commission, without detailed compensation schedules. S.
4377 differed from the vetoed legislation, however, in that it eliminated the provision that
254
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that Congress, in 1930, would have allowed suits in the federal
courts for personal injury and death claims up to $7500, as well as
for property claims up to $50,000, with administrative adjustment
of smaller claims for personal injuries and property damage.42
None of these bills came to a vote; nor did a similar bill introduced
in 1931.43 As the depression deepened, interest in federal tort
claims appears to have waned. None of the tort claims bills intro-
duced between 1933 and 1938 were reported out of the Senate or
House Committees on Claims."'
2. Modern Predecessors of the FTCA
The legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims Act itself be-
gan in 1939, with the introduction of S. 2690 and H.R. 7236.45 Con-
gress ultimately adopted the format of these two bills, and much of
their particular language, in the enacted version of the FTCA.
Each of these bills gave unified treatment to claims for property
damage and personal injuries, in contrast to the earlier proposals
that would have treated them separately. 4" Both provided for ad-
ministrative adjustment of claims up to $1000 and for concurrent
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and the federal district courts
over claims up to $7500.47
directed the Comptroller General to defend appeals to the Court of Claims. See 72 CONG.
REC. 9867-68 (1930) (statement of Sen. Howell). Compare S. 4377, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2
(1929) (printed as amended in 74 CONG. REC. 85 (1930)) with H.R. 9285, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2 (1927) (printed as amended in 69 CONG. REc. 4837 (1929)).
42. H.R. 17168, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930). H.R.
17168 was described in a House report as substantially similar to the bill that the House had
passed during the previous Congress. See HR. REP. No. 2800, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 8-14
(1931) (comparing H.R. 17168 to H.R. 9285, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927)). H.R. 16429 was
compared in House debate to H.R. 15468, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930), which provided only
for administrative adjustment of tort claims. See 74 CONG. REC. 3087-89 (1931) (statement
of Rep. Box).
43. S. 4567, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931); see S. REP. No. 658, 72d Cong., 1st Seas. (1932).
44. S. 1043, 74th Cong., Ist Seas. (1935); H.R. 2028, 74th Cong., 1st Seass. (1935); H.R. 8561,
73d Cong., 2d Seas. (1934); H.R. 129, 73d Cong., 1st Seas. (1933); S. 1833, 73d Cong., 1st Seas.
(1933).
45. S. 2690, 76th Cong., st Seas. (1939) reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at
1-4; H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. (1939), summarized in HR. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong.,
3d Seas. (1940).
46. See S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. (1939).
47. S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. §§ 1, 201 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. §§ 1,
201 (1939). This $7500 ceiling represented a substantial reduction from the previously
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More importantly for the purposes of this Article, each bill con-
tained several provisions relevant to interpretation of the punitive
damages exclusion in the final version of the FTCA. These provi-
sions fall into three categories. First, and foremost, the FTCA's pu-
nitive damages ban derived from a provision in these two bills
which read: "In respect to such claims the United States shall be
liable to the same ext6nt and in the same manner as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances, except that the United States
shall not be liable for punitive damages. '4 The FTCA adopts this
language virtually verbatim.49
Second, these bills contained numerous specific provisions of
substantive law applicable to federal tort claims. Two of these pro-
visions barred recovery when the plaintiff or the person in control
of the plaintiff's property was intoxicated or guilty of negligence or
willful misconduct" or when the plaintiff's injuries were aggra-
vated by unreasonable neglect or refusal of available medical or
surgical treatment.6 1 Another section provided for pro rata rather
than joint and several liability of the United States as a joint
tortfeasor.52 The significance of these provisions lies in their elimi-
nation from later versions of the FTCA, as Congress sought to
minimize the number of distinct federal rules of substantive law in
the FTCA5
vetoed legislation, which had allowed recovery for property damage up to $50,000 and had
allowed recovery of medical and funeral expenses beyond the $7500 limit on personal injury
claims. See supra note 39.
48. S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. § 201 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. § 201
(1939).
49. See supra note 2.
50. S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. § 302 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302
(1939).
51. S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Seass. § 304
(1939).
52. S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. § 306 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Seass. § 306
(1939).
53. See infra notes 64-65 & 77 and accompanying text. In addition, these two bills con-
tained several distinctive procedural provisions that were omitted from later proposals, in-
cluding sections 202 and 305 (governing depositions and physical examinations), section 307
(governing installment payments), section 204 (providing distributional shares for benefi-
ciaries in death cases), and section 308 (providing simplified procedures in death cases in-
volving small claims). S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Seass. §§ 202, 204, 305, 307, 308 (1939); H.R.
7236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202, 204, 305, 307, 308 (1939).
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Third, the administrative adjustment provisions of both bills re-
quired the Attorney General to promulgate rules and regulations to
prescribe "principles of decision" and to include "a schedule of the
amount of compensation to be awarded for specific physical inju-
ries. ' 54 The importance of these provisions lies in their potential
inconsistency with the requirement that the United States be lia-
ble to the same extent as a private individual. Senator Danaher
expressed concern about this inconsistency in the Senate hearings
on S. 2690, 5' and a representative of the Attorney General ac-
knowledged the conflict.56
Although the House passed H.R. 7236, 5  the Senate did not act
on that bill or on S. 2690. As a result, the proponents of these bills
were forced to introduce similar legislation in the next Congress."'
These bills followed the general outline of their immediate prede-
cessors, incorporating much of their language verbatim. The new
bills differed, however, in several significant respects.
In the House version, for example, the punitive damages exclu-
sion was extended to bar recovery of interest and costs.59 The im-
plicit understanding that state law would govern in litigation
under the bill6" also was made explicit by the addition of language
requiring courts to entertain claims based on negligent or wrongful
acts or omissions of government employees "under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with
54. S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1939).
55. See Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 44.
56. Id. at 44, 45 (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Ass't to the Att'y Gen.).
57. See 86 CoNG. REC. 12,032 (1940).
58. S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-4 (1942) and in 88 CONG. REC. 3174-75 (1942); S. 2207, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942);
H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). H.R. 5373
subsequently was amended to conform to H.R. 6463. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at
1-6 (text of amended version).
59. The interest and costs exclusion was added to H.R. 5373 when it was amended to
conform to H.R. 6463. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 3, 27 (text of § 301 of the
House bills).
60. See Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 44, 45 (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, Spe-
cial Ass't to the Att'y Gen., suggesting that the language requiring courts to hold the United
States liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual" would
mandate application of state law under the Erie doctrine).
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the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."61 This
language also was inserted in the administrative adjustment
provision of the House bill, while the section in the old bill that
authorized the Attorney General to promulgate rules of decision
was omitted.6 2 These changes, which were carried forward into the
final version of the FTCA, eliminated the inconsistency between
the administrative and litigation provisions of the old bills," and
signaled recognition of the dominant role of state law in tort claims
adjudication.
In further recognition of state law predominance, the new House
bill eliminated the specialized substantive provisions barring re-
covery for accidents caused by intoxication, contributory negli-
gence, or willful misconduct, and for aggravation of injuries due to
neglect or refusal of medical treatment,6 4 as well as a provision
governing distribution of shares to survivors in death cases. 5 The
new House bill also restricted original jurisdiction of suits against
the government to the federal district courts.6 This change elimi-
nated original jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, giving it only
appellate jurisdiction, because of a belief that this court lacked the
61. This language (emphasis added) was added to H.R. 5373 when it was amended to
conform to H.R. 6463. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 2-3, 26-27, 43 (text of § 301 of
the House bills). The language was carried forward and eventually was included in the
FTCA. See supra note 3.
62. These changes were made in H.R. 5373 when it was amended to conform to H.R.
6463. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 2; see also supra note 54 and accompanying
text (describing provisions of prior bills).
63. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. In his formal statement to the Judici-
ary Committee, Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea explained:
Under H.R. 5373, it is probable that local law would determine the liability of
the United States in suits on tort claims, but nothing is said of administrative
settlements. H.R. 6463 makes it clear that local law applies to the administra-
tive determination of such claims as well as to suits thereon. Uniformity in this
respect is obviously desirable.
House Hearings, supra note 26, at 26.
64. House Hearings, supra note 26, at 27, 43, 61; see also supra notes 50-51 and accompa-
nying text (describing relevant provisions of prior bills).
65. House Hearings, supra note 26, at 27, 30, 43, 61; see also supra note 53 (noting inclu-
sion of this provision in prior bills).
66. These changes were made in H.R. 5373 when it was amended to conform to H.R.
6463. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 2, 3.
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familiarity with state tort law that the district courts had devel-
oped in exercising their diversity jurisdiction.6 7
During the House Judiciary Committee hearings on this legisla-
tion, a representative of the Attorney General's office briefly dis-
cussed the punitive damages ban.6 8 Ultimately, this discussion
proved to be one of the few direct expressions of legislative intent
concerning this provision during the twenty years of hearings and
debate on the FTCA and its predecessors. Among other things, As-
sistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea told the Committee,
"[W]e think it is enough to satisfy the actual claim, rather than
impose punitive damages on the United States."'69 Although one
federal court has cited this statement to support the proposition
that Congress intended to limit its liability to the amount of the
plaintiff's actual loss, 70 nothing indicates that the Assistant Attor-
ney General was suggesting a federal measure of the "actual
claim." To the contrary, the Assistant Attorney General's state-
ment was made immediately following a discussion in which he re-
peatedly emphasized the bill's reference to "local law" for the rules
of decision.7 1 Read in this context, the statement suggests no
67. See id. at 27, 42-43 (formal statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Shea). The restriction of
original jurisdiction to the federal district courts meant that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure controlled discovery, permitting elimination of the special provisions in the old bills
regarding depositions and medical examination of claimants. See id. at 28, 30-31; see also
supra note 53 (noting inclusion of these provisions in prior bills).
68. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 30.
69. Id.
70. Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 1976).
71. The discussion preceding the statement proceeded as follows:
THE CHAIRMAN. You may go ahead.
MR. SHEA. H.R. 6463, insofar as it relates to administrative settlements,
permits the Federal agencies to consider and determine claims for death, as
well as for personal injury and property damage, which was not provided for in
the other bill (H.R. 5373).
Under the other bill it was not specifically provided that local law should
govern, and certain express provisions were made, for instance as to
distributions.
MR. CELLER. Do you need that? Is that necessary to express it?
MR. SHEA. I should think the earlier bill would probably be construed as
applying the local tort law, but this bill specifically covers it, leaving the distri-
bution in case of death and so forth to the local law.
MR. CELLER. The only trouble is in future bills you may have to put that
precedent in. If you leave it out the courts may not construe it should apply. I
am only thinking out loud to get your reaction.
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federal limitation on a state's measure of the "actual claim"; nor
does it indicate that the term "punitive damages" was being used
in any manner other than its ordinary sense. The statement's con-
trast between "punitive damages" and the "actual claim" of the
plaintiff simply indicated why recovery of punitive damages was
not necessary: "[I]t is enough to satisfy the actual claim." The ref-
erence does not permit the further implication that damages be-
yond those minimally necessary to compensate the plaintiff would
constitute punitive damages.
The Senate version of the bill, S. 2221, was virtually identical to
the amended House version. The ceiling on claims, however, was
raised from $7500 to $10,000,72 and liability was imposed for "neg-
ligence" rather than for a "negligent act or omission." This latter
change produced numerous minor alterations throughout the
text.73
MR. SHEA. This bill provides explicitly for the application of local law.
THE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.
MR. SHEA. The acceptance of the award by the claimant will also release
the delinquent employee as we have already pointed out. The bill leaves open
the right of the Government to recover back an award procured by fraud.
Title III provides for suits in the district courts. It differs from the earlier
bill in that the liability of the United States in such cases is to be the same as
that of a private individual, subject to the limitations of the bill, and is to be
reviewable by the Court of Claims, which we have discussed. Conformance to
local law is explicitly provided for here, as it was not in the prior bill.
The prior bill immunized the United States from punitive damages. This bill
also provides that neither interest nor costs shall be assessed against the
United States.
THE CHAIRMAN. Right there on the item of costs, is there a limitation on
the amount of costs which the Government can be responsible for which the
claimant has to pay?
MR. SHEA. It provides that no costs shall be assessed against the United
States.
THE CHAIRMAN. All right.
MR. SHEA. And we think it is enough to satisfy the actual claim, rather
than impose punitive damages on the United States.
House Hearings, supra note 26, at 30.
72. Compare S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1942) ($10,000 ceiling) with H.R. 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1942) ($7500 ceiling).
73. For example, the provisions mandating application of state law in administrative and
judicial proceedings stated that liability would be imposed "in accordance with the law of
the place where the negligence occurred" rather than "the place where the act or omission
occurred." S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201, 301 (1942).
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The Senate passed S. 2221 on March 30, 1942,74 and the House
subsequently considered this version in lieu of its own bill. The
House Committee on the Judiciary recommended passage of the
bill, but not without certain important amendments.7 5 For
example, the committee reinstated the language from the prior
bills and from the House Version in the current Congress that im-
posed liability for any "negligent or wrongful act or omission" in-
stead of for "negligence" alone.76 Because the new bill required
state law to govern the rights and liabilities of the United States,
the committee eliminated the provision concerning proportionate
liability of the United States as a joint tortfeasor. 7 The committee
also clarified the provision barring recovery of interest, stating that
it operated only with respect to prejudgment interest.7 18 The ac-
companying provision barring recovery of costs was eliminated
completely;7 9 in fact, the new version expressly allowed recovery of
costs "to the same extent as if the United States were a private
litigant, except that such costs shall not include attorneys' fees."80
The language barring recovery of punitive damages was not
changed.1
Despite the Judiciary Committee's efforts, the House never ac-
ted on the committee bill. In addition, none of the federal tort
claims bills introduced during the next Congress82 were reported
out of committee. Proponents of federal tort claims legislation fi-
nally achieved their goal in the following Congress. The new House
bill, H.R. 181,83 essentially mirrored the House Judiciary Commit-
74. See 88 CONG. REC. 3175 (1942).
75. See HR. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). The text. of the bill after the
committee amended it is reprinted id. at 1-5, and the differences between it and the Senate
version are described id. at 11-12.
76. See id. at 2, 11.
77. See id. at 12; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting inclusion of this
provision in prior bills).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 2, 11.
80. Id. at 2.
81. See id. at 2, 11.
82. S. 1114, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 1356, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 817,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
83. H.R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
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tee version of S. 2221.84 Although the House Judiciary Committee
reported this bill with a favorable recommendation,85 the full
House never voted on it.
The Senate version, S. 2177,6 met with greater success. This bill
was introduced and enacted as Title IV of the Legislative Reorgan-
ization Act of 1946. This enacted version of the FTCA was almost
identical to its House counterparts, except that it eliminated the
$10,000 limitation on tort claims, thereby creating unlimited fed-
eral tort liability.8 7 The primary reason for eliminating the $10,000
ceiling was Congress' desire to ban all private claims bills and to
eliminate the Committee on Claims as part of the overall reorgani-
zation of Congress that it accomplished with the Legislative Reor-
ganization Act.88 So long as a ceiling was placed on federal tort
84. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. In particular, H.R. 181 incorporated
the $10,000 ceiling on damages and the language barring punitive damages and prejudgment
interest. H.R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
85. See H. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., st Sess. 1 (1945).
86. S. 2177, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
87. All previous federal tort claims bills had contained a dollar limitation on the amount
that a claimant could seek in either administrative or judicial proceedings. See, e.g., H.R.
181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) ($10,000 limitation); S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942),
reprinted as amended in H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1942) ($10,000 limi-
tation in both original and amended version); H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ($7500
limitation); see also supra notes 47 & 72 and accompanying text (describing provisions of
previous bills). The early federal tort claims proposals contained equivalent limitations on
personal injury and death claims. See, "e.g., S. 4377, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1929) ($7500 plus
medical and funeral expenses); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. (1927) ($7500 plus medical
and funeral expenses); H.R. 8651, 69th Cong., st Sess. (1925) ($5000 plus medical and fu-
neral expenses); S. 1912, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925) ($5000, amended to $3000 in the
Senate).
88. According to the Senate committee that considered the Legislative Reorganization
Act:
The essential difference is that the House bill puts a maximum limitation of
$10,000 on claims for which suit may be brought, whereas this title as reported
by your committee contains no such limitation. The committee is of the opin-
ion that in view of the banning of private claim bills in the Congress no such
limitation should be imposed, and that with respect to this type of claim the
Government should be put in the same position as any private party.
S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U.S. 543, 549-50 (1951); 92 CONG. REC. 10,048 (1946). But see 92 CONG. REc. 10,092-93 (state-
ment of Rep. Monroney suggesting that the $10,000 limitation was omitted because by spec-
ifying an upper limit Congress "might be setting a pattern for making larger awards on
claims").
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claims litigation, any claim in excess of the ceiling still could have
been the subject of a private bill. 9
3. Passage of the FTCA and Congressional Intent
The legislative history of the FTCA and its predecessors indi-
cates that the purposes of the FTCA were to ease the burden and
expense of handling the flood of private claims bills, and to waive
sovereign immunity so that claimants against the government
could obtain redress as a matter of right rather than legislative
grace.90 Implicit in the waiver of sovereign immunity was the con-
cept that the government should be treated the same as any pri-
vate defendant. The elimination of the dollar limitation on tort
claims from the final version of the FTCA is particularly indicative
of these purposes.
Because of initial congressional reluctance to abandon the prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity, the earliest proposals had emphasized
administrative adjustment of tort claims, substituting the expertise
of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission for
the cumbersome and haphazard performance of the House and
Senate Committees on Claims.9 1 Congressional attachment to the
89. See Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 12-13 (memorandum to the Att'y Gen. from
Special Ass't Alexander Holtzoff dated June 7, 1939); id. at 34 (statement of Mr. Holtzoff);
House Hearings, supra note 26, at 20-21 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Francis M. Shea);
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1945) (minority views concerning H.R. 181).
90. The Senate committee considering the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 stated:
For many years the present system has been subjected to criticism, both as
being unduly burdensome to the Congress and as being unjust to the claim-
ants, in that it does not accord to injured parties a recovery as a matter of
right but bases any award that may be made on considerations of grace.
S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946) (quoting H. R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1945)). This statement echoes language in committee reports on earlier bills. See
HR. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2-3 (1940); S. REP. No. 658, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1932); H.R. REP. No. 2800, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 2-3 (1931); S. REP. No. 1699, 70th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1929); HR. REP. No. 286, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1928); HR. REP. No. 667, 69th
Cong., st Sess. 1-3 (1926); H.R. REP. No. 206, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926); accord Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953);
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-140 (1950); House Hearings, supra note 26, at 24-
25, 39-40, 45 (concerning H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463); Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 7, 9,
34, 50-51 (concerning S. 2690).
91. See, e.g., S. 4377, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1929); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927);
H.R.,8651, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925); S. 1912, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925). Proposals for
administrative adjustment by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission
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system of sovereign immunity as moderated through private legis-
lation also was evidenced by the provisions in the earlier proposals
that set maximum dollar limits. In particular, the $5000 ceiling on
personal injury and death claims was derived from the limit im-
posed on private claims legislation by the House and Senate Com-
mittees on Claims.92
Although Congressman Celler long had advocated unlimited fed-
eral tort liability,"3 the dollar limitations on personal injury and
death claims were retained until the eve of the FTCA's enact-
ment.9 4 Even the House version of the bill that was enacted as the
FTCA had set a $10,000 ceiling on tort claims. When the Senate
finally eliminated the $10,000 limit, it did so "in view of the ban-
ning of private claim bills" and because "with respect to this type
of claim the Government should be put in the same position as any
private party."95
recurred as late as 1940. See Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 53-66 (statement of Com-
mission member J.J. Keegan and text of his proposed amendment to S. 2690, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939)).
92. See 92 CONG. REC. 10,092 (1946) (statement of Rep. Scrivner); 69 CONG. REC. 2193
(1928) (statement of Rep. Hudspeth).
93. See H.R. REP. No. 667, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1926) (supplementary report concern-
ing S. 1912); H.R. REP. No. 206, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1926) (supplementary report con-
cerning H.R. 8651); 67 CONG. REC. 10,029-34 (1926) (statement of Rep. Celler).
94. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); supra note 87 and accompanying
text. The inclusion of a dollar limitation in all federal tort claims proposals prior to the final
version of the FTCA may explain the absence of legislative history concerning the provision
barring punitive damages. The punitive damages ban would be of little significance if an
absolute ceiling were imposed on federal tort claims, because a limitation of $5000 or even
$10,000 often would prevent courts from awarding complete compensatory damages, much
less additional punitive damages. Only with unlimited federal tort liability could the puni-
tive damages ban have significant financial consequences. As a result, Congress had no rea-
son to trouble itself with a precise definition when it considered bills containing limitations
on liability. When Congress lifted the ceiling on the eve of the FTCA's enactment, it did not
pause to consider whether a precise definition of "punitive damages" might be necessary to
prevent improper awards of substantial punitive damages under the guise of compensatory
damages.
The practical unimportance of the punitive damages provision in the earlier versions of
the FTCA also is reflected by the greater attention that Congress paid to provisions con-
cerning awards for prejudgment interest and costs to successful litigants. The House added
these provisions to H.R. 6463 in 1942, and amended them later that year when it considered
S. 2221. See S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
These provisions also were the subject of discussion in House hearings. See House Hearings,
supra note 26, at 30-31.
95. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946).
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The notion that the government should be treated the same as
any private defendant was a persistent theme throughout the
twenty years of debate that led to enactment of the FTCA. Critics
of sovereign immunity had emphasized the unfairness of forcing
persons injured by United States employees to pursue the slow and
uncertain process of private legislation, while persons injured by
private parties had the right to sue for the full amount of their
damages.96 The congressional desire for uniformity of treatment
between persons injured by government employees and persons
injured by private parties was reflected in the provisions expressly
mandating that both administrative adjustment and litigation of
tort claims be decided "in accordance with" state law.97 Having de-
cided that state law should govern to the greatest extent possible,
Congress progressively whittled away the numerous substantive re-
strictions on federal tort claims so that plaintiffs suing the govern-
ment would fare the same as plaintiffs suing private citizens.9 8 As
the final step in this process, Congress removed the ceiling on fed-
eral tort claim recovery, thus putting the government "in the same
position as any private party.
e99
In light of this legislative history, the provision barring recovery
of punitive damages emerges as a limited exception within a gen-
eral scheme aimed at ensuring that federal tort claimants be
treated the same as plaintiffs suing private defendants. Nothing in
the legislative history indicates any unusual understanding of the
term "punitive damages"; nor does the history indicate any con-
gressional intent to limit plaintiffs to any minimal standard of
compensation. 100
96. See supra note 90.
97. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 64-65 & 77 and accompanying text; see also supra note 53 (listing
distinctive procedural provisions of previous bills, which were omitted prior to enactment of
the FTCA).
99. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); supra notes 87-88 & 94 and
accompanying text.
100. In fact, the opposite conclusion could be drawn. In the only lucid post-1940 discus-
sion of the measure of damages in death cases, Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, emphasized that state law must determine the measure of damages even
though the results might be illogical or might result in undercompensation. In hearings
before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Holtzoff stated, "It seems to me
the situation here is no different from the case of death resulting from the tort of a private
individual." Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 46. This discussion indicates that the
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Although the legislative history of the FTCA is virtually silent
concerning the rationale for the punitive damages ban, three re-
lated reasons for this proscription can be inferred from other
sources. First, most intentional torts are excluded from the cover-
age of the FTCA. 101 Most victims of aggravated misconduct by
government employees, therefore, cannot even sue the government,
much less recover punitive damages. In the absence of the pro-
scription, courts still might have awarded punitive damages in a
narrow category of cases involving willful, wanton, or reckless mis-
conduct in the commission of a non-intentional tort. Even within
this category of cases, however, courts and commentators have
struggled in vain to articulate a distinction between reckless mis-
conduct, for which punitive damages may be awarded, and mere
negligence, for which punitive damages are not warranted."' 2 Given
the limited number of situations in which punitive damages might
have been appropriate, and the difficulty of determining whether
they should be awarded in those cases, Congress may have imposed
the absolute ban on punitive damages to save the courts from the
necessity of making these fine distinctions.
Second, the FTCA imposes liability on the government for the
acts of its employees, based on the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior.103 The recoverability of punitive damanges under this doc-
trine generated, and still generates, considerable controversy. 104
Authorities are split widely concerning whether principals should
be liable for punitive damages because of aggravated misconduct
drafters of the FTCA were fully aware of the various state wrongful death statutes, many of
which measured damages based on the value of the decedent's gross estate and not on the
actual loss of the survivors. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
101. "The provisions of this title shall not apply to ... any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-
der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." Federal Tort Claims
Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, § 421(h), 60 Stat. 812, 846 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1982)).
102. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492-95 (1875); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 9-10 (4th ed. 1971); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 280-
82; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 123(8) (1966); 17 C.J. Damages § 284 (1919).
103. See Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 42, 44.
104. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 102, at 12; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 HAMv. L. REV. 1173, 1199-1205 (1931); Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages
Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296
(1961).
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by their agents.1"5 Given this controversy, the punitive damages
ban could be viewed as Congress' acceptance of the argument that
punitive damage awards against the government would neither
punish the offenders nor deter similar misconduct by other govern-
ment employees.106
Third, and finally, Congress undoubtedly was concerned about
minimizing the cost to the government from federal tort claims.
Congress' concern for the redress of damages caused by govern-
ment employees could be satisfied by an award of compensatory
damages to the victims. 107 Because punitive damage awards against
the government were not necessary to achieve full compensation
and would not necessarily have advanced the goals of deterrence
and punishment, Congress simply may have seen no reason to im-
pose the added cost of punitive damages on the government.10 8
Considered as a whole, the legislative history of the FTCA indi-
cates that the members of the Department of Justice who drafted
the FTCA, and the members of Congress who enacted it, employed
the term "punitive damages" in the ordinary sense of its accepted
legal definition. The legislative history also indicates that Congress
intended state law to govern claims under the FTCA to the great-
est extent possible, in the interest of equal treatment for plaintiffs
suing the government and plaintiffs suing private defendants.
4. The Punitive Damages Proviso
Shortly after Congress passed the FTCA, problems arose due to
a conflict between the punitive damages ban and the laws of both
Alabama and Massachusetts. The courts of these states had inter-
preted their wrongful death statutes as entirely punitive rather
than compensatory in nature,109 and the Department of Justice
105. See W. PROSSER, supra note 102, at 12; Morris, supra note 104, at 1204.
106. In an analogous context-tort claims against municipalities-courts "almost without
exception" have refused to impose liability on municipal corporations for the unauthorized
and unratified acts of employees. W. PROSSER, supra note 102, at 12 n.91; see Morris, supra
note 104, at 1204.
107. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
108. In discussing tort claims against municipalities, one commentator suggested: "As-
sessment of punitive damages against a city would probably impoverish the public treasury
without serving the admonitory function." Morris, supra note 104, at 1204.
109. See Jack Cole, Inc. v Walker, 240 Ala. 683, 200 So. 768 (1941); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Davis, 236 Ala. 191, 181 So. 695 (1938); Southern Ry. v. Sherrill, 232 Ala. 184, 167 So. 731
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attempted to take advantage of the interpretations by moving to
dismiss FTCA wrongful death actions in these states, based on the
punitive damages ban. 10 Congress reacted quickly, retroactively
amending the FTCA in 1947. The amendment changed the section
barring liability for punitive damages and prejudgment interest by
adding the proviso
[t]hat in any case wherein death was caused, where the law of
the place where the act or omission complained of occurred pro-
vides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only puni-
tive in nature, the United States shall be liable for actual or
compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries re-
sulting from such death to the persons, respectively, for whose
benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof.111
This proviso creates a substitute measure of damages in states
where wrongful death actions are viewed as solely punitive, al-
lowing plaintiffs in those states to recover "compensatory damages,
measured by the pecuniary injuries" to the survivors.1 1 2 The pro-
viso does not apply to cases brought in states where the wrongful
death statute permits recovery of compensatory as well as punitive
damages. In these cases, the law instructs federal courts simply to
award compensatory damages in accordance with state law, and to
exclude any punitive damages.111
(1936); Arnold v. Jacobs, 316 Mass. 81, 54 N.E.2d 922 (1944); Macchiaroli v. Howell, 294
Mass. 144, 200 N.E. 905 (1936); Porter v. Sorell, 280 Mass. 457, 182 N.E. 837 (1932); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 356-57.
110. See HR. REP. No. 748, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1548, 1548-49.
111. Act of Aug. 1, 1947, ch. 446, § 410(a), 61 Stat. 722. As amended and codified, this
section now provides:
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place
where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been con-
strued to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall
be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary inju-
ries resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the
action was brought, in lieu thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
112. Act of Aug. 1, 1947, ch. 446, § 410(a), 61 Stat. 722 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 (1982)).
113. Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 666 n.7 (9th Cir. 1976); see Hartz v. United
States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969); D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 20 n.12 (1st
Cir.) (noting that the proviso's restriction to "pecuniary injuries" does not apply to
268 [Vol. 27:245
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At about the same time that Congress enacted the punitive dam-
ages proviso, Massachusetts amended its wrongful death act to
provide for compensatory damages, with a maximum award of
$15,000.114 In 1949, however, Massachusetts reverted back to a sys-
tem of purely punitive damages,11 5 and in 1951 it raised the ceiling
on wrongful death awards to $20,000.116 The existence of this ceil-
ing created a further problem in FTCA cases because nothing in
the punitive damages proviso of 1947 indicated whether such a
ceiling would limit the amount of compensatory damages that a
court could award under the proviso. The federal courts first con-
fronted this question in United States v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Insurance Co.117 Although the district court in that case held
that the $20,000 limitation did not apply to FTCA actions under
the proviso,11 the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed. 1 9 The court of appeals reasoned that, even
though the Massachusetts statute was punitive in nature, it set the
maximum amount recoverable as compensatory damages under the
FTCA. 120 The United States Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote,
reversed the court of appeals and restored the holding of the dis-
trict court.121 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas explained
why the state-imposed limitation on punitive damages should not
apply to a federal court's determination of compensatory damages
under the FTCA:
The standard of liability imposed by the Congress is at war with
the one provided by Massachusetts. The standard of liability
under the Massachusetts Death Act is punitive-i.e., "with ref-
erence to the degree" of culpability-not compensatory. The
standard under the Tort Claims Act is "compensatory," i.e.,
"measured by the pecuniary injuries" resulting from the death.
There is nothing in the Massachusetts law which measuresg the
determination of compensatory damages when state wrongful death statute is only partially
punitive), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
114. 1947 Mass. Acts, ch. 506; see Beatty v. Fox, 328 Mass. 216, 102 N.E.2d 781 (1952).
115. 1949 Mass. Acts, ch. 427. /
116. 1951 Mass. Acts, ch. 250.
117. 227 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1955), rev'd, 352 U.S. 128 (1956).
118. See id. at 386.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956).
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damages by "pecuniary injuries." The Massachusetts law, there-
fore, cannot be taken to define the nature of the damages that
can be recovered under the Tort Claims Act.
In those States where punitive damages only are allowed for
wrongful death, a limitation on the amount of liability has no
relevance to the policy of placing limits on liability where dam-
ages are only compensatory. By definition, punitive damages are
based upon the degree of the defendant's culpability. Where a
state legislature imposes a maximum limit on such a punitive
measure, it has decided that this is the highest punishment
which should be imposed on a wrongdoer. This limitation, based
as it is on concepts of punishment, cannot control a recovery
from which Congress has eliminated all considerations of
punishment.1 22
Justice Douglas' opinion provides further useful evidence con-
cerning the proper interpretation of "punitive damages" under the
FTCA. His opinion repeatedly emphasized that damages under the
Massachusetts statute were punitive because: (1) they were based
on the degree of the defendant's culpability; and (2) their primary
purpose was to punish the defendant.123 Significantly, the opinion
emphasized the state court decisions that had characterized the
Massachusetts statute as punitive. 124 This focus on the state's
characterization of its own statute is consistent with the history of
the punitive damages proviso, which was enacted in response to
state court interpretations of the Alabama and Massachusetts
wrongful death statutes.125
122. Id. at 132-33.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 129 (penal character of the Massachusetts statute evidenced by "the hold-
ing of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts"); see also id. at 130 & n.2 (citation of
Alabama Supreme Court decisions concerning the punitive nature of damages under the
Alabama wrongful death statute).
125. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. Although neither the text of the
proviso nor the accompanying committee report expressly indicates that state court deci-
sions were to be the sole determinant of whether a state statute provided only punitive
damages, the report does indicate that these court decisions at least should be given sub-
stantial weight. See H.R. REP. No. 748, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1548.
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III. THE PROPER ROLE OF STATE LAW IN DETERMINING WHETHER
DAMAGES ARE "PUNITIVE" UNDER THE FTCA
Interpretation of the term "punitive damages" in the FTCA un-
doubtedly implicates federal law, but this does not preclude refer-
ence to state law definitions. In interpreting other federal laws, the
United States Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that state
law may be adopted as the federal rule when a uniform national
body of law is not needed and when the state rule would not
frustrate particular federal objectives.126 With regard to the mean-
ing of "punitive damages," the language of the FTCA and the leg-
islative history strongly suggest that Congress intended the district
courts to apply state law.
The FTCA by its terms subjects the government to damage lia-
bility in accordance with state law, rather than imposing a uniform
federal measure of damages. 127 The predominant role of state law
under the FTCA is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's decision
in Richards v. United States,28 in which the Court held that
126. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (adopting state
law to govern the priority of liens, rejecting arguments that Federal Housing Administration
and Small Business Administration loans should take precedence over private liens); United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) (applying state law concerning the capacity of married
women to contract even though the state rule caused the federal government to lose a pre-
ferred claim against the wife's separate property); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570
(1956) (holding that the term "children" in the federal copyright laws should be defined
with reference to state law); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204
(1946) (using state law to define "real property" in a federal statute that subjected the
plaintiff to state and local taxation on real property but not on personal property or in-
tangibles); cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197
(1982) (stating that Congress intended some reference to state corporation law to determine
whether nonprofit corporations could solicit "members"); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696 (1966) (using state law to determine whether an action was based on a written
contract or an oral contract for purposes of the applicable state statute of limitations); cf.
also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Finance Admin., 440 U.S. 447 (1979) (invalidating a city
occupancy tax on bank property because of Congress' clear intent that occupancy taxes be
levied on real property, despite its characterization by the state court as a tax on tangible
personal property); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 597 (1973)
(refusing to apply retroactively a Louisiana statute governing reservation of mineral rights
because it was "hostile" to federal interests and "would deal a serious blow to the congres-
sional scheme contemplated in the Migratory Bird Conservation Act").
127. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956).
128. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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conflict of law questions under the FTCA must be resolved accord-
ing to state choice of law rules.1 29 According to the Court:
[The FTCA] was not patterned to operate with complete inde-
pendence from the principles of law developed in the common
law and refined by statute and judicial decision in the various
States. Rather, it was designed to build upon the legal relation-
ships formulated and characterized by the States, and, to that
extent, the statutory scheme is exemplary of the generally inter-
stitial character of federal law.130
The legislative history of the FTCA also supports application of
state law to determine whether damages are punitive or compensa-
tory. That history reveals a strong desire for intrastate uniformity,
so that a plaintiff suing the government in a particular state would
receive the same compensation as any other plaintiff in that
state.131 The desire for intrastate uniformity requires application of
state law to the greatest extent possible. If the federal court super-
imposed a variant federal definition of punitive damages, intra-
state uniformity would be defeated because the damages awarded
under the FTCA would differ from those available to other plain-
tiffs in a particular state.
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Beaver County132 is instructive concerning the
role of state law definitions in determining the scope of the federal
waiver of immunity. That case involved the liability of the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation for a local tax that applied to the
corporation's real property but not to its personal property. The
Court considered whether a county could define machinery within
a plant as "real property" so that the county could avoid a federal
ban on taxation of the corporation's personal property. 3 3 The
Court held that a county could rely on state law to define real and
personal property:
Congress in permitting local taxation of the real property, made
it impossible to apply the law with uniform tax consequences in
129. Id. at 6-7.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
132. 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
133. Id. at 206.
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each state and locality... Furthermore, Congress, had it de-
sired complete nationwide uniformity as to tax consequences,
could have stipulated for fixed payments in lieu of taxes, as it
has done in other statutes ...
We think the congressional purpose can best be accomplished
by application of settled state rules as to what constitutes "real
property" so long as it is plain, as it is here, that the state rules
do not effect a discrimination against the government, or pa-
tently run counter to the terms of the Act.""'
Because state law determined the amount of tax liability, the
Court in Reconstruction Finance Corp. reasoned that state law
also should determine the scope of tax liability through its defini-
tions of real and personal property.135 The same reasoning applies
with equal force to damage determinations under the FTCA. Be-
cause Congress has indicated its desire to have state law determine
the amount of damages, the scope of damages also should depend
upon state law and state definitions of "compensatory" and "puni-
tive" damages.
The subsequent decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Texas"36 is
even more closely on point. In that case, the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered whether a state assessment of penalties and interest against
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation constituted a permissible
"tax" or an impermissible "penalty." The court held that Texas
law governed, and it applied state law definitions in determining
that the assessment was an invalid penalty.13 7
These considerations indicate that federal courts should follow a
state's characterization of "punitive damages" under its damage
134. Id. at 209-10.
135. Id. at 208-09.
136. 229 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 907 (1956).
137. According to the court:
[T]he determination of whether penalties and interests [sic], as such, are a
part of the ad valorem tax must be governed by the substantive law of the
State of Texas. Since Congress did not define the term "taxation" as that word
is used in Section 8 of the Act, it is, therefore, clear by force of the Beaver
County decision that the Congressional purpose can best be accomplished by
application of settled State rules in determining whether the word "taxation"
as used in Section 8 includes penalties and interest.
Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
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law unless that state's definition is inconsistent with the terms of
the FTCA,138 contrary to legislative policy," 9 discriminatory
against the government, 40 or "entirely strange to those familiar
with its ordinary usage."' 4' The reference to state law for the defi-
nition of "punitive damages" would not entirely eliminate the need
for a federal definition, because a federal definition would remain
necessary to determine whether a state's characterization of its
damage law as compensatory was aberrational or was inconsistent
with the terms of the FTCA. Reference to a federal definition also
would be necessary in any case in which a state had not had occa-
sion to characterize a particular measure of damages as compensa-
tory or punitive. 142
The significance of the adoption of state law definitions is that it
would accord presumptive validity to each state's law of compensa-
tory damages. In most cases, federal courts simply could accept a
state's measure of compensatory damages without undertaking a
refined comparison of state and federal definitions. Only if some
aspect of a state's measure of compensatory damages were mani-
festly punitive within the meaning of the FTCA would a federal
court be required to eliminate that punitive aspect in assessing
damages.
IV. JUDICIAL MISINTERPRETATION AND EXPANSION OF THE PUNITIVE
DAMAGES BAN
In light of the clear and unambiguous meaning of "punitive
damages" reflected in the statute and its legislative history, and
the availability and importance of state law in determining that
meaning, the failure of so many federal courts to interpret the
term according to its customary meaning is difficult to explain.
The root of the answer lies in the adage that "hard cases make bad
law." Most of the seminal cases in which federal courts have con-
strued the punitive damages ban have been wrongful death
138. Cf. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Finance Admin., 440 U.S. 447 (1979); Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946).
139. Cf. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 597 (1973); United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
140. Cf. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946).
141. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956).
142. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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actions, which generally are among the hardest of cases. Commen-
tators suggest that Lord Ellenborough made "bad law" in Baker v.
Bolton143 when he stated that "the death of a human being could
not be complained of as an injury."1" The adoption of this rule by
American courts likewise has been labeled "bad law.'
14
5
Following the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in England,146
American legislatures adopted a variety of wrongful death statutes,
each with its own measure of damages. While some of these stat-
utes limit survivors to recovery of only pecuniary losses, others ad-
ditionally allow them to recover for intangibles such as grief, loss
of consortium, and loss of companionship. A few wrongful death
statutes measure damages based on the value of the decedent's es-
tate rather than the loss to the survivors. Other statutes fit none of
these patterns.
Reducing the value of a life to monetary terms raises moral and
philosophical issues extending far beyond the question of statutory
construction. The issues are framed most painfully in actions in-
volving the death of young children, such as the case that con-
fronted the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Hoyt v. United States.4 1 Hoyt was an FTCA action arising from
the death of a seven-year-old child on a military base in Alabama.
Because Alabama's wrongful death statute was strictly punitive,
the punitive damages proviso of the FTCA required the federal
district court to apply a federal measure of damages that limited
the father to recovery of "pecuniary injuries."'s' Applying this
standard, the district court awarded the plaintiff only the cost of
the child's funeral.150 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the
143. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
144. The quotation and criticism appear in W. PROSSER, supra note 102, at 901-02. See
also T. LAMBERT, History and Future, in WRONGFUL DEATH AND SunvivOsmsH' 4-5 (W. Beall
ed. 1957) (criticizing Lord Ellenborough's decision).
145. See, e.g., J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY § 233 (1972); S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.3 (1966).
146. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
147. See S. SPEIsER, supra note 145, at 54-70; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 339-74.
The drafters of the FTCA knew of the variety of damage measures that states employed in
wrongful death cases. See supra note 100; Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 45-56.
148. 286 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1961).
149. Id. at 357; see supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
150. See 286 F.2d at 357.
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federal standard allowed the father to recover not just the funeral
expenses, but also the "contributions" he could have expected
from his son, including the loss of services and earnings of the
child during minority and the loss of future gifts of goods and ser-
vices that he reasonably could have expected from the child during
his lifetime.151 The court rejected the government's argument that
the cost of rearing the child to majority should be deducted from
the award, stating that Congress did not intend "any such cold-
blooded deduction," which "would treat an incalculable loss as a(pecuniary gain.' ,,152
Because Hoyt involved the punitive damages proviso and its fed-
eral standard of "pecuniary" damages, it is not directly relevant to
FTCA wrongful death actions arising in the forty-eight states
where the standard punitive damages ban applies. More relevant
to FTCA wrongful death actions in these states is Hartz v. United
States,153 an FTCA action in Georgia brought by the widow of a
pilot whose airplane crashed due to an air traffic controller's negli-
gence. The Georgia wrongful death statute allowed recovery of the
"full value of the life of the decedent," measured by the present
discounted value of the amount that the decedent would have
earned during his lifetime, without deduction of the decedent's
personal expenses had he lived. 4 The Georgia courts had charac-
terized damages under this statute as punitive to the extent that
they exceeded the survivors' actual losses.1 55 Relying upon this
characterization, the Fifth Circuit held that the FTCA's punitive
damages ban required elimination of the punitive aspect of the
damage award.156 The Georgia statute, however, did not provide
separate, explicit measures of punitive and compensatory damages.
Rather, the Georgia courts had construed the statute as punitive
insofar as it awarded damages exceeding the actual loss to the sur-
vivors. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the punitive
151. Id. at 359-60.
152. Id. at 362 (emphasis by the court).
153. 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969).
154. See id. at 260 n.3, 263 n.9, 264.
155. Savannah Elec. Co. v. Bell, 124 Ga. 663, 53 S.E. 109 (1906) (cited in Hartz, 415 F.2d
at 264); Collins v. McPherson, 91 Ga. App. 347, 85 S.E.2d 552 (1954) (cited in Hartz, 415
F.2d at 264); accord Atlantic, V. & W. Ry. v. McDilda, 125 Ga. 468, 54 S.E. 140 (1906).
156. 415 F.2d at 264.
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damages ban required the court to deduct the personal expenses
that the decedent would have incurred, and permitted it to deduct
taxes as well, because only the decedent's net earnings after these
deductions would have been available to his family had he
survived. 157
The problematic aspect of Hartz is the broad statement at the
end of the court's opinion:
[T]he trial court, in a federal tort claims act, cannot award a
judgment in excess of the injury suffered by the survivor, and to
the extent that in a case involving proven annual income of this
size, the trial court should give reasonable consideration to the
incidence of federal income taxation in arriving at a final
judgment.158
If limited to claims governed by the Georgia wrongful death stat-
ute, the court's statement clearly would be correct. The statement
goes further, however. On its face, this language purports to apply
equally to all FTCA actions, thus implying that the FTCA itself
requires deduction of a decedent's income taxes to avoid an award
of punitive damages. The same is true of the court's holding with
respect to personal expenses. Although these statements should be
limited to the context of the Fifth Circuit's primary reliance on
Georgia's own characterization of its wrongful death statute, courts
unfortunately have followed Hartz in subsequent cases without re-
gard to this distinction. 159
A few years after Hartz, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit decided D'Ambra v. United States,8 0 which in-
volved an action by the parents of a four-year-old child killed by a
mail truck in Rhode Island. Rhode Island's wrongful death statute
allowed plaintiffs to recover the present value of decedents' gross
lifetime earnings, with estimated personal expenses deducted. 16
157. Id.
158. Id. at 265 (emphasis by the court).
159. See Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Hartz as
requiring deduction of income taxes as a matter of federal law), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984); infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text; Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 669
(9th Cir. 1976) (citing Hartz as requiring deduction of personal expenses as a matter of
federal law); infra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
160. 481 F.2d 14 (st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
161. See id. at 16.
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The court in D'Ambra framed the question as "whether Congress
intended in a wrongful death case to accept liability over and
above compensating the survivors to the extent of their loss."'1 2
The court noted that, if the decedent had lived, he would have
spent most of his lifetime earnings on his own wife and children,
and his parents would have received only a small portion of the
statutory measure of damages.16 3 The court concluded that the
statute was punitive to the extent that the parents' recovery ex-
ceeded their actual loss from the child's death. 6 4
To support its holding, the court discussed the legislative history
of the FTCA and the 1947 proviso:
With this background we turn to consider what was meant by
the term "punitive" in the principal section of the Act. Punitive
damages, whether viewed as "smart money" or as a deterrent, is
[sic] that part of the award that is not compensatory; the terms
are mutually exclusive. Thus, the Georgia [Supreme C]ourt,
speaking directly to the point, said that its wrongful death stat-
ute "is penal in that the measure of the recovery is the full value
of the life of the deceased, irrespective of its real value to the
person in whom the cause of action is vested." . . . Following
this appraisal, the court in Hartz v. United States refused to
apply the Georgia statute in an FTCA case. 6 5
D'Ambra is the first case in which a federal court expressly cate-
gorized a state measure of damages as "punitive" under the FTCA
because it exceeded the amount of the plaintiffs' actual loss, with-
out regard to the state court's characterization of the statute.'6 6
Indeed, the First Circuit made no inquiry into the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's interpretation of its wrongful death act. The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Hartz was distinguisha-
ble because the Georgia courts had characterized certain damages
under the statute in Hartz as punitive in nature, while the Rhode
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 16-18.
165. Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
166. Although courts had invalidated damage awards under the FTCA in previous cases,
these holdings had been based on the trial court's erroneous application of state law con-
cerning compensatory damages. See, e.g., O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir.
1959).
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Island court had made no such determination regarding the statute
in D'Ambra. According to the First Circuit: "The statute must be
judged not by its language, nor the state court's characterization,
but by its consequences. '167 In a footnote, the court elaborated:
"The only significance we attached to the circumstance that the
Georgia court described its statute as partially penal is that state
courts do not normally have occasion to consider the distinction,
which, in turn, might result in the federal court not being alerted
to the issue. 1 6
Having determined that the Rhode Island statute provided some
punitive damages but that it was not solely punitive," 9 the court
recognized that it was not bound by the "pecuniary injuries" stan-
dard of the punitive damages proviso.170 Instead, the FTCA re-
quired the court to apply Rhode Island's measure of compensatory
damages, but not to award any punitive damages. The First Circuit
rejected the most obvious solution, which, consistent with the Fifth
Circuit's decisions in Hoyt and Hartz, would have limited the par-
ents' recovery to the percentage of'damages recoverable under the
Rhode Island statute representing their anticipated contributions
from the decedent.1 71 Instead, starting from the questionable pre-
mise that it faced "a statutory void resulting from [its] holding the
Rhode Island statute inapplicable as being partly punitive, 1 72 the
First Circuit undertook to create its own measure of compensatory
damages.1 73 Following a protracted discussion of possible alterna-
tive damage measures for a child's wrongful death, 4 the court
concluded that compensatory damages in such cases should be
measured "by the loss of the companionship and society of the in-
fant victim. '17 5
167. 481 F.2d at 18.
168. Id. at 18 n.7.
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. 481 F.2d at 20 & n.12.
171. See id. at 19.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 19-21.
175. Id. at 20-21. Two alternatives that the court rejected were: (1) "strictly applying a
pecuniary benefits-less-cost analysis-which would, if rigorously applied to the death of a
very young child, yield a zero result"; and (2) "by blinking at costs of uprearing and specu-
lating on earnings and contributions decades hence, to come up with a recovery satisfying an
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.Although the First Circuit's discussion of alternatives demon-
strated considerable insight, the court completely ignored the
FTCA requirement that state law determine the measure of dam-
ages. The court made no attempt to determine Rhode Island's
principles of compensatory damage law in common law actions for
personal injuries not resulting in death. In fact, the court did not
cite a single decision of any Rhode Island court. The First Circuit
completely neglected the possibility that Rhode Island might have
deemed its statutory measure of damages entirely "compensatory"
even though it did not measure the survivors' monetary loss pre-
cisely. For example, a Rhode Island court might have treated the
portion of the recovery exceeding the plaintiffs' pecuniary loss as
compensation for emotional and psychological injuries, including
loss of society and companionship.
The reason underlying the First Circuit's failure to consider
state law apparently was its belief that a uniform federal damage
measure was desirable. The court advocated congressional action
"to establish a clearly defined, and, since it is a federal act recog-
nizing federal policy, possibly a uniform standard on measure of
damages." 1176 This statement demonstrates the First Circuit's total
failure to appreciate that Congress intended to have state law gov-
ern FTCA actions to the greatest possible extent, so that plaintiffs
suing the government and plaintiffs suing private parties would re-
ceive equal treatment. Congress did not intend to create interstate
uniformity; it intended to create intrastate uniformity.
Even if a federal standard for "punitive damages" were appro-
priate, the court's opinion in D'Ambra still would be flawed in two
respects. First, the court applied an idiosyncratic definition of "pu-
nitive damages." Its characterization of all damages exceeding
those necessary to compensate the plaintiffs as "punitive damages"
was completely contrary to the plain meaning of the term.1 7 Sec-
ond, even assuming the legitimacy of the First Circuit's definition,
the court did not apply this definition to the statute as a whole;
instead, it considered only whether the statute was punitive as
unarticulated sense of justice while paying lip service to the old common law calculus." Id.
at 19.
176. Id. at 21.
177. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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applied to the particular facts of the case before it. Any measure of
damages under a wrongful death act inherently involves the
imprecision associated with estimation of such variable factors as
longevity, wage trends, inflation, interest rates, and tax schedules,
as well as the assumption that the beneficiaries would have sur-
vived and would have remained in a dependent relationship with
the victim. Because of this imprecision, application of any general
rule for measuring compensatory damages may result in either
overcompensation or undercompensation in any given case. Merely
because a state's damage measure may overcompensate survivors
in a particular case does not make its measure of damages "puni-
tive."'1 8 If the First Circuit's approach were followed generally,
every federal district court presented with a federal tort claim
would have to determine whether applying the state measure of
damages to the case before it would overcompensate that particu-
lar plaintiff. Surely this is not what Congress intended when it im-
posed liability on the government "in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred"'719 and "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances."180
Two years after the First Circuit's decision in D'Ambra, the
Ninth Circuit decided United States v. English.'8' English is sig-
nificant because it contains ill-considered dicta that the Ninth Cir-
cuit later adopted as its interpretation of the FTCA punitive dam-
ages ban. In English, the district court awarded substantial
damages to the widow of a sixty-three-year-old electrical contrac-
tor who was crushed by a crane at a naval shipyard in California.
The government appealed, contending that the lost earnings award
was "punitive and erroneous" because the trial court failed to
178. Cf., e.g., Siverson v. United States, 710 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1983) (collateral source
rule did not result in punitive damages even though plaintiff received windfall double recov-
ery); infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text; Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d
Cir. 1978) (collateral source rule did not result in punitive damages even though plaintiff
received windfall double recovery); infra notes 254 & 255; Kalavity v. United States, 584
F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1978) (award to remarried widow did not result in punitive damages even
though plaintiff also received support from new husband); infra notes 209-17 and accompa-
nying text.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
180. Id. § 2674.
181. 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975).
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deduct a sufficient amount for the decedent's personal expendi-
tures and income taxes and because the court did not discount the
award to present value.182 Although the Ninth Circuit stated that
it was resolving these issues in accordance with state law,183 the
court also made the following general statement concerning the
FTCA:
The amount of damages to be awarded under the Federal
Torts [sic] Claims Act is governed by the law of the place of the
wrongful act. If the local law provides for punitive damages, or
permits application of standards which result in plaintiffs get-
ting more than compensatory damages, only compensatory
damages may be awarded.'8
This statement evinces a willingness to look beyond a state's char-
acterization and to apply a federal standard to determine whether
a plaintiff is "getting more than compensatory damages." Despite
its earlier statement that the case would be governed by state law,
the court said that it was "considering both Federal and California
law"'18 5 to reach its conclusion that the district court should have
deducted personal expenses and taxes from the award and that it
should have discounted the award to its present value. 8 6
Although the Ninth Circuit did not clearly articulate the basis
for its opinion in English, several factors indicate that its trouble-
some statements concerning federal law were no more than dicta.
For example, the holding in English requiring discounting of
awards to present value appears to be based on California law,
given the court's citation to a California case that expressly re-
quired such discounting. 8 7 In two subsequent cases, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has recognized that it decided the discounting issue in English
under the law of California. 88 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has said
182. See id. at 67, 71-72.
183. See id. at 65.
184. Id. at 70 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
185. Id. at 71.
186. Id. at 71-72.
187. Bond v. United R.R. of S.F., 159 Cal. 270, 286, 113 P. 366, 373 (1911) (cited in Eng-
lish, 521 F.2d at 72) (holding that plaintiff "was not entitled to a present judgment for the
total amount of such future receipts, but only for the present value").
188. Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1984); Hollinger v. United
States, 651 F.2d 636, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1981).
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that its statement in English regarding the deduction of income
taxes from projected earnings was based on California law."89
Moreover, the statements concerning deductions for personal ex-
penses and taxes were dicta because the court did not hold that
these deductions were required. The plaintiff in English did not
challenge the propriety of the deductions for personal expenses
and taxes; the court's holding was simply a rejection of the govern-
ment's contention that the amount of these deductions was
insufficient.
What was merely dictum in English, however, became law one
year later in Felder v. United States. 90 Felder involved an air-
plane accident caused by the negligence of an air traffic controller
in Arizona. The district court had deducted federal and state in-
come taxes from the award, and the plaintiffs contended on appeal
that the deduction was contrary to Arizona law.19' Even though an
earlier Ninth Circuit decision indicated that the plaintiffs' conten-
tion was correct,192 in Felder the Ninth Circuit characterized the
state law on the subject as "unclear."' 93 The court nonetheless held
that it was "spared. . .the difficult and disconcerting task of sec-
ond guessing the Arizona court" because federal law required the
deduction of income taxes from the award.194 According to the
court, a failure to deduct income taxes would have resulted in an
award of "punitive damages" against the government in violation
of the FTCA.
The Ninth Circuit derived its definition of "punitive damages"
in Felder from an analysis of the legislative history of the FTCA.
Although the court conceded that the "long and complex legisla-
tive history of the Act does not speak directly to this issue,"' 95 it
claimed to have found passages in the legislative history suggesting
"that the Government was making itself liable only for losses
189. Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 669 n.15 (9th Cir. 1976).
190. 543 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1976).
191. Id. at 665.
192. See United States v. Becker, 378 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1967). In Becker, the court ex-
pressly rejected the government's argument that the trial court should have subtracted fed-
eral income taxes from future earnings, stating- "The indications are that, under the law of
Arizona, the incident of income tax has no part in arriving at a damage award." Id. at 324.
193. 543 F.2d at 666.
194. Id. at 667.
195. Id.
19861 283
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:245
actually suffered by plaintiffs."' 96 First, the court quoted from a
1941 report of the Committee on Claims concerning a supposed
"predecessor" bill to the FTCA.197 The bill in question 98 was not
in any respect a predecessor of the FTCA,"' however, and there-
fore the three-page committee report has absolutely no bearing on
interpretation of the FTCA. The court also quoted Assistant At-
torney General Shea's statement that the FTCA was intended to
"redress tortious wrongs" and that "we think it is enough to satisfy
the actual claim rather than impose punitive damages on the
United States. ' 200 As explained earlier in this Article, however, Mr.
Shea's comparison of "punitive damages" to the victim's "actual
claim" merely served to explain why punitive damages were unnec-
essary and did not purport to define "punitive damages." When
read in the context of Mr. Shea's repeated reference to the FTCA's
reliance on local law, his use of the phrase "actual claim" must
have referred to the actual claim as measured by state law and not
by a federal standard. 0 ' It certainly did not suggest a definition of
"punitive damages" contrary to the accepted meaning of the term.
After the court's cursory and misleading discussion of the
FTCA's legislative history, it turned to the history of the punitive
196. Id. at 668.
197. Id. (quoting a passage from H.R. REP. No. 1112, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941), sug-
gesting that private citizens injured by the government should be "reimbursed promptly").
198. H.R. 5185, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
199. The bill considered in the report was not a general federal tort claims bill; it pro-
posed only to extend the Small Claims Act of 1922 to allow settlement, within a $1000 limit,
of claims for "hospital, medical, or burial expenses" along with propeity damage claims.
Unlike the four federal tort claims bills introduced in the same Congress, the Small Claims
Act bill involved only administrative adjustment of small claims with a ceiling of $1000, it
had no provision for litigation, and it did not even mention punitive damages. The develop-
ment of federal tort claims legislation was reflected not in this bill but in the four general
tort claims bills. S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); S. 2207, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942);
H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); see supra
notes 58-81 and accompanying text. These bills were drafted with the assistance of the At-
torney General's office, see House Hearings, supra note 26, at 1, while the Small Claims Act
bill was drafted by the Acting Secretary of Agriculture, see H.R. REP. No. 1112, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1941).
The erroneous reliance on the committee report was repeated in Comment, supra note 19,
at 258 & n.68, 260 & n.78.
200. House Hearings, supra note 26, at 29, 30 (quoted in Felder, 543 F.2d at 668) (em-
phasis by the court).
201. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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damages proviso adopted in 1947. In examining this history, the
court relied upon a statement made by the Comptroller General in
an unpublished hearing concerning the proviso.20 2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit conceded that the quoted passage "has obvious limitations as
an authoritative statement" because the proviso was enacted by a
different Congress and because the proviso, unlike the FTCA, re-
stricted plaintiffs in Alabama and Massachusetts to recovery of
only their pecuniary losses.203 The court nevertheless accepted the
passage "as some evidence of congressional intent to expose the
Government to liability only for compensatory damages. '20 4 The
court also supported its conclusion with a quotation from a Su-
preme Court opinion in which the Court had stated that the
FTCA's purpose "was to compensate the victims of negligence" by
government employees. 20 5
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that recovery under the FTCA is
limited to "compensatory damages" is not at all controversial. The
court erred, however, in its further conclusion that any award of
damages exceeding the plaintiff's actual loss must be noncompen-
satory punitive damages. Besides its questionable analysis of the
legislative history, the Ninth Circuit based its conclusion that all
damages exceeding actual losses were "punitive" on language from
English, D'Ambra, and Hartz.206 As discussed above, these state-
ments were either ill-considered dicta or holdings reflecting a mis-
interpretation of the FTCA.20 7 In fact, the court conceded that its
definition of "punitive damages" was inconsistent with the ac-
cepted meaning of the term.208
202. Felder, 543 F.2d at 668 & n.13 (quoting Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 128, 131 (1956), which, in turn, was quoting excerpts of the hearings from
the government's brief in that case).
203. Id. at 668.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955)) (emphasis
added by the Ninth Circuit).
206. See id. at 669.
207. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing Hartz); supra notes 160-
80 (discussing D'Ambra); supra notes 181-89 (discussing English).
208. The court stated:
It appears settled, then, that the purpose of the FTCA is compensation, that
is, it is intended to repay the amount of loss or injury sustained by a plaintiff
as a proximate result of governmental misconduct which gave rise to the cause
of action. Although the Act does not define punitive damages, they may be
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Two years later, in Kalavity v. United States,0 9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the peculiar
definition of punitive damages that the First and Ninth Circuits
had adopted. Kalavity, like Hartz and Felder, involved a fatality
caused by an air traffic controller's negligence. Both the plaintiff
and the government appealed the award made by the district
court. The government challenged the district court's failure to de-.
duct support that the decedent's widow would receive from her
new husband, while the plaintiff challenged the district court's de-
duction of income taxes from the award.21 0
The district court had refused to deduct support received from
the plaintiff's new husband because Ohio law clearly prohibited re-
duction of awards based on the remarriage of a surviving spouse.2 11,
In affirming the trial court on this point, the Sixth Circuit rejected
as "farfetched" the government's argument that any award exceed-
ing a plaintiff's actual loss constitutes impermissible "punitive
damages" under the FTCA:
Government counsel argues that any award of damages over and
above plaintiff's actual loss is "punitive" and that since plain-
tiff's remarriage entitles her to the support and companionship
of her new spouse, she should not be compensated for the con-
tinuing loss of the support and affection of her dead husband.
To follow state law in this case, the government argues, would
undermine the purposes of the Tort Claims Act by allowing re-
covery for damages not actually suffered.
This argument on the effect of plaintiff's remarriage is far-
fetched. No court has adopted it. It says, in essence, that a
claimant may recover only direct or out-of-pocket losses: every-
thing else is "punitive."...
thought of generally as damages intended to punish and deter. However, we
are not bound to a narrow definition. Since the interpretation and application
of the Act is a matter of federal law, we look to the purposa of the Act for a
definition of punitive. Likewise, in deciding if a state statute is punitive, we
look not to its language nor to the state court's characterization of it. Rather,
we look to its effect.
543 F.2d at 669.
209. 584 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1978).
210. Id. at 811.
211. See id. at 810.
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Damages do not become "punitive" when a court refuses to
consider and reduce a wrongful death award because the dece-
dent's spouse is now living with another person who supports
her financially and emotionally.2
12
In a footnote, the court explained its conception of "punitive dam-
ages": "Damages are 'punitive' when awarded separately for the
sole purpose of punishing a tortfeasor who inflicted injuries 'mali-
ciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or
indignity.' ,,213
According to the court, the plaintiff's challenge of the income tax
deduction presented a more difficult issue. In the absence of con-
trolling state law, the court applied the "McWeeney exception,"
which provides that no adjustment for taxes is necessary for the
lost earnings of those "at the lower or middle reach of the income
scale. 1 14 Based on this doctrine, the court reversed the district
court's deduction of income taxes from the award.215
Curiously, the Sixth Circuit in Kalavity referred to Felder v.
United States as a "well-reasoned case" in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit "thoroughly reviewed the legislative history" of the FTCA.216
212. Id. at 811. The court continued:
We note also that the purpose of ordinary tort damages, as distinguished
from "punitive" damages, is both to compensate and to deter. Tort law mixes
these two purposes, compensation and deterrence, when it awards ordinary
damages. Tort law may award as customary damages something more than
simply out-of-pocket loss, something for deterrence, without spilling over into
"punitive" damages awarded solely for the purpose of punishment. This confu-
sion of purpose is clearly illustrated by the fact that, by statute, liability to pay
damages for the pain and suffering and loss of earnings of a decedent during
his life now survives his death and attaches to his estate while, at common law,
the tortfeasor's death terminated his liability and that of his estate. In exclud-
ing "punitive" damages from the coverage of the Tort Claims Act, we believe
that Congress simply prohibited use of a retributive theory of punishment
against the government, not a theory of damages which would exclude all cus-
tomary damages awarded under traditional tort law principles which mix theo-
ries of compensation and deterrence together.
Id. (citation omitted).
213. Id. at 811 n.1 (quoting Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875)).
214. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 870 (1960). The Sixth Circuit noted that it, along with several other circuits, had
adopted the exception. Kalavity, 584 F.2d at 812 (citing cases decided in the First, Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits).
215. 584 F.2d at 813.
216. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit apparently failed to recognize that the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning concerning the taxation issue in Felder was
identical to the reasoning that the Sixth Circuit called "farfetched"
when asserted by the government in the context of the remarriage
issue in Kalavity. 17
The deduction of income taxes also was an issue in the Fifth
Circuit's consideration of Harden v. United States.218 In that case,
the plaintiffs appealed an award compensating them for the death
of their fifteen-year-old son, who had been shot by an employee at
a government campsite in Georgia. 219 The plaintiffs asserted that
the district court should not have deducted income taxes from the
lost earnings award, arguing that the court should have applied the
McWeeney exception because the decedent's projected earnings
were in the low-to-middle income range.120 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected this argument, stating that "the effect of income taxes, like
other items of personal expense, must be considered in awarding
compensatory damages." ''
In holding that the deduction of income taxes was required,
Harden represented only a small step beyond the Fifth Circuit's
earlier decision in Hartz v. United States,22 in which the court
had held that consideration of income taxes was permissible.225
217. See id. at 811; supra text accompanying note 212. The two contexts may be distin-
guishable, but the basis for such a distinction is not readily apparent. Both issues involved
the argument that any award exceeding a plaintiff's actual loss is "punitive" under the
FTCA. As with its rejection of an offset for support received from the plaintiff's new hus-
band, the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the offset for income taxes under the McWeeney ex-
ception was based in part on the premise that the amount of the offset would involve undue
speculation in ordinary cases. Compare Kalavity, 584 F.2d at 811 with Mcweeney v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). As a
result, the Sixth Circuit's analysis of "punitive damages" should apply equally to both issues
in Kalavity.
The Sixth Circuit's failure to recognize the inconsistency between its praise of Felder and
its rejection of the government's analogous argument concerning the remarriage issue in
Kalavity may reflect a lack of careful attention to Felder. The Sixth Circuit treated Felder
as distinguishable from Kalavity because it involved decedents with larger incomes. See 584
F.2d at 813.
218. 688 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1982).
219. Id. at 1027.
220. Id. at 1029-30; see supra note 214 and accompanying text.
221. 688 F.2d at 1030.
222. 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969); see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
223. See 415 F.2d at 264; supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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Because the Georgia state courts had characterized the state law as
"punitive, ' 224 the holding in Harden, like Hartz, could be inter-
preted as applying only to FTCA actions under Georgia law. The
Fifth Circuit, however, cited with approval the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Felder,225 as well as a Supreme Court decision requiring
deduction of taxes from damage awards as a matter of federal law
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2 6 The tenor of the
opinion in Harden, therefore, suggests that the Fifth Circuit would
require deduction of taxes in all FTCA actions, including cases in
which the applicable state law allows damages without such deduc-
tions and does not characterize these damages as "punitive."
Shortly before the Fifth Circuit decided Harden, the Ninth Cir-
cuit confronted the issues of taxation and of discounting to present
value for the third time2 27 in Hollinger v. United States,228 an
FTCA action involving Alaska law. Alaska had adopted a "total
offset" rule, under which the interest rate used to discount awards
to present value is offset against the rate used to project wage in-
creases from inflation and productivity gains, based on the as-
sumption that the two rates would be identical.229 Courts applying
the total offset rule neither increase future earnings by an infla-
tionary factor nor reduce future earnings to present value. Because
Alaska's offset rule purported to take into account discounting to
present value, albeit as an offset against inflation, the Ninth Cir-
cuit could have approved the use of this simple state law approach
in FTCA actions. 30 Instead, the court adopted dicta from its
224. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
225. 543 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1976) (cited in Harden, 688 F.2d at 1029).
226. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980) (cited in Harden, 688 F.2d at 1029).
227. The Ninth Circuit previously had confronted these issues in Felder v. United States,
543 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1976), and United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975). See
supra notes 181-208 and accompanying text.
228. 651 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1981).
229. See Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
230. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit approved the use of Penn-
sylvania's total offset rule in FTCA actions in Barnes v. United States, 685 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.
1982). In that case, the Third Circuit rejected the government's argument "that failure to
reduce an award for lost future earnings to present worth is tantamount to awarding puni-
tive damages disguised as compensation." Id. at 70. The court stated:
We reject this proposition because the total offset rule ... does include reduc-
tion to present worth. Indeed, that is its theoretical underpinning...
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earlier opinion in English, which involved California law, stating
that a court "may not assume that the discount rate and the infla-
tion rate will net to zero."23 Accordingly, the court in Hollinger
required the district court on remand to make an independent ex-
amination, relying on expert testimony, to determine whether
Alaska's total offset method would result in a higher award than if
the court had increased damages to compensate for inflation and
then had discounted them to present value. If the total offset ap-
proach would yield a larger award, according to the court, the ex-
cess would be "punitive" under the FTCA and would have to be
deducted from the final award.3 2 Because the outcome of this
analysis would vary with changes in interest and inflation rates,
the Ninth Circuit's approach would require courts to perform this
analysis in every FTCA case in which the applicable state law em-
ployed a total offset approach.33
With respect to federal and state income taxes, Alaska law
clearly required courts to award damages with no deduction for
We are also mindful that our duty in this case is to apply the law of Pennsyl-
vania to whatever extent that law can be viewed to be reasonably consistent
with the FTCA. It was Congress's objective in § 2674 to afford state tort laws
considerable prominence in the resolution of suits against the government as
tortfeasor, and we are obligated not to overlook that policy judgment in recon-
ciling the terms of § 2674 that are at issue in this case. The Pennsylvania
courts have decided that the goal of fair compensation for future lost wages is
best served by a rule which favors predictable simplicity over mathematical
exactitude. We cannot say that such a policy is in any sense punitive. We are
persuaded that the total offset method is a reasonable method of predicting
lost earnings; to the extent that it may overcompensate the injured party
should inflation and interest rates cease to co-vary significantly, we cannot con-
clude that the rule exceeds the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
Id. at 70 (footnote omitted) (emphasis by the court).
231. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoted in Hollinger, 651 F.2d at 641).
232. 651 F.2d at 642. In Barnes v. United States, 685 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1982), the Third
Circuit declined to follow Hollinger, stating, "[W]e find its analysis unpersuasive." Id. at 70
n.3.
233. A court could avoid this inquiry if neither party supplied an expert witness to pro-
vide the necessary facts and opinions. Alternatively, the parties might agree to use either a
particular discount rate or the total offset method. See, e.g., Abille v. United States, 482 F.
Supp. 703, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (parties stipulated to Alaska's total offset damage law in an
FTCA action); cf. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (criticiz-
ing case-by-case approach and adopting a partial offset rule requiring use of a "below mar-
ket" or "real" interest rate for discounting).
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taxes.234 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the FTCA required
deduction of taxes. 235 The court thus extended Felder to a case in
which state law unambiguously prohibited deduction.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hollinger conflicts with the
FTCA's express mandate that the extent of damage liability be de-
termined in accordance with state law. Notwithstanding Alaska's
clearly articulated law of damages, which expressly purported to be
compensatory and not punitive, the Ninth Circuit established an
entirely different and far more complex federal measure of dam-
ages which necessitates expert testimony concerning future rates of
interest, inflation, and taxation. The court's decision was com-
pletely at odds with Congress' desire for intrastate uniformity in
the treatment of persons injured by the government and persons
injured by private citizens. The resulting disuniformity is high-
lighted in cases involving both the United States and a private
party as codefendants. In these cases, the Ninth Circuit's rule com-
pels district courts to make separate damage calculations for each
defendant.3 6
The ultimate expression of the overly-expansive federal punitive
damages standard under the FTCA, however, had to be the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Flannery v. United States.37 In that case,
twenty-two-year-old Michael Flannery had been left permanently
semi-comatose after being struck by a government-owned automo-
bile negligently driven by a government employee in the course of
his employment. In a suit on his behalf, the district court awarded
damages of $365,158.80 for medical and nursing expenses, $535,855
for impairment of earning capacity, and $1,300,000 for loss of abil-
ity to enjoy life.238 The government appealed, contending that the
district court should have deducted federal income taxes from the
234. Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 670-73 (Alaska 1967) (cited in Hollinger, 651 F.2d
at 642).
235. 651 F.2d at 642.
236. In Macey v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 684 (D. Alaska 1978), the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska indicated its disagreement with Felder but, in ac-
cordance with Felder and subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions, it ruled that the FTCA re-
quired it to discount the damage award against the government to present value even
though damages against the private codefendant would not be discounted. See id. at 688-89,
691.
237. 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
238. See id. at 110.
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lost earnings award and that West Virginia law did not authorize
an award for loss of ability to enjoy life when the plaintiff was una-
ble to sense the injury.239 Because both issues appeared to involve
unsettled questions of West Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit certi-
fied both questions for decision by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. 40
The West Virginia court provided explicit answers to each of the
certified questions. 41 With regard to the taxation question, the
state court said that "in computing the loss of future earning ca-
pacity a deduction need not be made for federal income taxes. 2
4 2
Concerning the right of a semi-comatose plaintiff to recover for
loss of ability to enjoy life, the court ruled that "a plaintiff in a
personal injury action who has been rendered permanently semi-
comatose is entitled to recover for the impairment of his capacity
to enjoy life as a measure of the permanency of his injuries even
though he may not be able to sense his loss. '243
After receiving these definitive statements of West Virginia law,
however, the Fourth Circuit purported to discover "federal ques-
11244 itions lurking in the case, and it countermanded the state court
on both issues. The court of appeals began by stating that a uni-
form federal standard was required because the meaning of "puni-
tive damages" would determine the extent of the waiver of sover-
eign immunity.245 Starting from this false premise,246 the court
239. Flannery v. United States, 649 F.2d 270, 271-72 (4th Cir. 1981).
240. Id. at 272-73.
241. See Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982).
242. Id. at 434, 441.
243. Id. at 434, 439.
244. Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1226 (1984).
245. Id. In full, the court stated:
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a waiver of immunity from suit of the United
States, and conditions attached to the waiver must be strictly enforced. The
government's immunity is waived insofar as compensatory damages may be de-
termined and awarded. The door for the assertion of private tort claims in
federal courts is opened that far, but then the question arises about the allowa-
bility of damages treated and labeled under state law as "compensatory" which
are in excess of those necessary to provide compensation for injuries and losses
actually sustained.
The question of the allowance of such damages is one of federal law. What is
compensatory and what is punitive, within the meaning of the statute, is re-
lated directly to the extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity. How widely
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referred to D'Ambra and Felder for guidance in fashioning a defi-
nition of "punitive damages" that was contrary to the plain mean-
ing of the term:
The FTCA's proscription of awards of punitive damages au-
thorizes only those awards that compensate or reimburse, or
provide recompense or redress for injuries suffered by the claim-
ant. To the extent that an award gives more than the actual loss
suffered by the claimant, it is "punitive" whether or not it car-
ries with it the deterrent and punishing attributes typically as-
sociated with the word "punitive."247
The court proceeded to apply this definition in a manner that only
can be described as adding insult to injury:
There is no doubt that Flannery has lost "his capacity to en-
joy life." He is conscious of nothing and incapable of enjoying
anything.... There is no likelihood whatever that he will ever
become aware of anything.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that, as
a matter of state law, damages for the loss of the capacity to
enjoy life were assessable upon an objective basis, and it did not
matter that this particular plaintiff is unaware of his loss. It is
the Congress intended to open the door is not a matter to be resolved under
the widely varying laws of the fifty states, but under a uniform standard. Thus,
as was said in D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973), a state's
statutory measure of damages "must be judged not by its language or the
state's characterization, but by its consequences."
Id.
246. The Fourth Circuit's assertion that courts must strictly construe conditions attached
to the waiver of sovereign immunity flies in the face of rather forceful indications by the
United States Supreme Court that the doctrine of strict construction does not apply to the
broad waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U.S. 543 (1951), for example, the Court noted: "The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the
Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language." Id. at 547. In a footnote, the
Court explained that "Where a statute contains a clear and sweeping waiver of immunity
from suit on all claims with certain well defined exceptions, resort to that rule [of strict
construction] cannot be had in order to enlarge the exceptions." Id. at 548 n.5. The Court
concluded: "Recognizing such a clearly defined breadth of purpose for the [FTCA] as a
whole, and the general trend toward increasing the scope of the waiver by the United States
of its sovereign immunity from suit, it is inconsistent to whittle it down by refinements." Id.
at 550. Other Supreme Court cases contain similar pronouncements. See United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1963); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320
(1957); see also Note, supra note 22, at 537.
247. 718 F.2d at 111.
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perfectly clear, however, that an award of $1,300,000 for the loss
of enjoyment of life cannot provide him with any consolation or
ease any burden resting upon him. . . . He cannot use the
$1,300,000. He cannot spend it upon necessities or pleasures.
Since the award of $1,300,000 can provide Flannery with no
direct benefit, the award is punitive and not allowable under the
FTCA.24
1
Given the court's mishandling of the loss of enjoyment of life
issue, its conclusion concerning the income tax deduction issue in
Flannery is not difficult to guess. The court concluded, of course,
that the FTCA requires the deduction of federal income taxes from
future earnings awards. 249 As if that were not enough, the court
decided sua sponte to reduce the award for lost earnings even fur-
ther, on the grounds that it duplicated the award of future medical
expenses.250
The Ninth Circuit has declined to apply its federal definition of
"punitive damages" as ruthlessly as the Fourth Circuit. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit seems to have begun a retreat from its imposition of
248. Id. Judge Hall vigorously dissented from the majority opinion in Flannery. Judge
Hall argued that the court should have adopted the "common-sense approach to the mean-
ing of 'punitive' under the FTCA" employed by the Sixth Circuit in Kalavity. Id. at 115
(Hall, J., dissenting). He also emphasized that state law should govern FTCA actions in the
interest of intrastate uniformity, noting.
The majority has thus succeeded in creating two conflicting standards for dam-
ages awards in West Virginia. In the future, a victim, such as Flannery, who is
injured by a private party, will be entitled to recover damages for loss of enjoy-
ment of life, while that same person, if injured at the hands of the government
will receive nothing.
Id. at 114 (Hall, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 111.
250. Id. at 112-13. Putting aside the procedural question of whether the trial court's deci-
sion was so plainly erroneous that sua sponte appellate consideration was warranted, the
Fourth Circuit probably was correct in asserting that the expenses for nursing and custodial
care covered by the award for future medical expenses duplicated to some extent the ex-
penses for food and shelter covered by the award for loss of earnings. Nevertheless, without
considering any of the differences between the costs of living in a nursing home and living
independently, or any of the other elements of an award for future medical expenses, the
court deducted the full amount of the plaintiff's award for future medical expenses. It left
standing only the awards for lost earnings and for medical expenses incurred before trial.
The court's opinion is reminiscent of the ironic aphorism that at common law "it was more
profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him." W. PROSSER, supra
note 102, at 901-02. Apparently, in the Fourth Circuit the government now will find it more
profitable to render a tort victim comatose than to leave him conscious of his disability.
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a federal standard in Felder.25' In Siverson v. United States,252 for
example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's application
of Arizona's "collateral source" rule to preclude deduction of the
plaintiff's Medicare benefits from the award of damages against
the government under the FTCA. s5 Citing several decisions from
other circuits to support its finding that Medicare payments are a
"collateral" source because they are paid out of a special fund to
which the beneficiary or the beneficiary's relatives have contrib-
uted, and noting the district court's finding that the government
had not demonstrated either the amount of plaintiff's benefits or
the extent to which the United States had contributed to them,
the court upheld the award.254 The court summarily disposed of
the argument that the excess recovery constituted "punitive dam-
ages" under the FTCA:
The government contends to not deduct Medicare expenses
from Siverson's award constitutes punitive damages because the
effect is a windfall double recovery for Siverson. The govern-
ment's rationale would essentially always find recovery from a
collateral source to be "punitive" and ignores the collateral
source doctrine's purpose of preventing a windfall to the
defendant.25 5
251. See supra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
252. 710 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1983).
253. Under the laws of many states, including Arizona, a defendant's damage liability is
not reduced by any benefits that the plaintiff receives from "collateral sources" such as
insurance payments or sick pay. See Michael v. Cole, 122 Ariz. 450, 595 P.2d 995 (1979)
(cited in Siverson, 710 F.2d at 558); see also infra note 255 (discussing application of other
states' collateral source rules in FTCA actions).
254. 710 F.2d at 559-60. Although the collateral source rule ordinarily applies to all bene-
fits received from a fund to which the plaintiff or a relative has contributed, the language in
the opinion noting the government's failure to prove the extent of its contributions implies
that, if the government had met this burden, it might have been entitled to an offset to the
extent of its contributions. The Tenth Circuit is in accord with this position. See Steckler v.
United States, 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1972) (Social Security benefits are not collateral to
the extent of any government contributions; plaintiff has the burden of tracing contribu-
tions). The Third Circuit, however, has criticized this approach as "impracticable." Smith v.
United States, 587 F.2d 1013, 1016 (3d Cir. 1978) (expressly declining to follow Steckler).
255. 710 F.2d at 560. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also has
rejected the argument that the collateral source rule results in impermissible "punitive dam-
ages" under the FTCA. The court explained:
We believe that the result we reach is consistent with the FTCA's proscrip-
tion on punitive damages. It was the government's position at oral argument
that whenever a FTCA victim is entitled to compensation from another
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Most recently, in Shaw v. United States, 256 the Ninth Circuit
dealt with the implications of Felder in a case decided under the
law of Washington. The plaintiffs in Shaw, a child and his parents,
received a large verdict against the United States for negligent de-
livery procedures in a government hospital that left the child with
severe physical and intellectual impairments. The issues on appeal
source-even a private source-such sums must be deducted from the FTCA
recovery. The government contended that, even if this victim had been
privately insured, for example, by a policy paid for entirely by himself, the
proceeds from such a policy must be deducted from any recovery against the
government or else the government is subject to punitive damages. Merely to
state the government's position is to refute it. Were we to adopt the govern-
ment's position we would deprive a victim of benefits-which he has paid for
out of his own wages-merely because he had the misfortune to have been
injured by the United States rather than by a private tortfeasor.
Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013, 1016-17 (3d Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
by the court).
The positions of the Ninth Circuit in Siverson and the Third Circuit in Smith are consis-
tent with the treatment of the collateral source rule in other FTCA cases in which the puni-
tive damages question never was brought into issue. In FTCA actions, federal circuit courts
consistently have upheld applications of state collateral source doctrines to preclude reduc-
tion of awards against the government, even when the United States partially funded the
"collateral" source, as long as the benefits were paid from a program or special fund sup-
plied in part by contributions of the beneficiary or a relative of the beneficiary. See, e.g.,
Leeper v. United States, 756 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1985) (Pennsylvania law entitled plaintiff to
damages for loss of accumulated sick leave with United States Postal Service); Titchnell v.
United States, 681 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1982) (Medicare payments were a collateral source
under Pennsylvania law because plaintiffs had contributed to the funds); Smith v. United
States, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1978) (Social Security survivor benefits to widow were collat-
eral under Pennsylvania law because they were paid out of a fund to which decedent con-
tributed); United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1961) (benefits received under Civil
Service Retirement Act were collateral under Virginia law); United States v. Harue Hayashi,
282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960) (Social Security survivor benefits were collateral under Hawaii
law because they were paid out of funds to which decedent had contributed); United States
v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949) (proceeds of National Service Life Insurance policy
were collateral source under North Carolina law). In cases in which the decedent or his
beneficiary did not contribute to the "collateral" source, however, courts have refused to
apply the doctrine. See, e.g., Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1980) (Mis-
souri collateral source rule inapplicable without evidence that plaintiff contributed to Medi-
care fund); Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964) (medical care received at
Veteran's Administration Hospital not a collateral source under Pennsylvania law). Even in
the cases in which federal courts did not apply the collateral source rule, however, the courts
held that the source was not "collateral" as a matter of state law, not that the FTCA pre-
cluded application of the rule to expand recovery beyond a plaintiff's actual losses. See
Overton, 619 F.2d at 1299; Feeley, 337 F.2d at 924.
256. 741 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984).
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included deduction of income taxes,25 7 discounting to present
value,2 58 and the extent of non-pecuniary awards.259
Because Washington law did not require a deduction for future
income taxes unless an extremely high income was involved, the
district court had made no findings concerning taxes.260 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, following its holding in Felder that required
courts to deduct taxes from all lost earnings awards.26 ' Surpris-
ingly, however, the court did so reluctantly, indicating that it
shared the concern of the Sixth Circuit, which had "questioned the
wisdom of adopting such a rule in the context of a statute referring
us to state law." 262
An even more interesting aspect of Shaw was the court's rejec-
tion of the government's argument that the five million dollar
award to the injured child for non-pecuniary damages was punitive
because the large pecuniary award adequately compensated the
plaintiffs. The court noted that Washington law permits plaintiffs
to recover damages "for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and
loss of capacity to lead a normal life, and characterizes such
awards as compensatory. '263 The court dismissed the government's
contention that "an award is punitive to the extent a claimant re-
ceives more than his 'actual loss,' "6 emphasizing the role of state
law under the FTCA and citing Kalavity as the proper interpreta-
tion of "punitive damages" in the FTCA.265
257. Id. at 1206-07.
258. Id. at 1207-08. The court's discussion of the discounting process was not particularly
controversial because Washington law required discounting to present value. See Warner v.
McCaughan, 77 Wash. 2d 178, 460 P.2d 272 (1969) (cited in Shaw, 741 F.2d at 1207).
259. Id. at 1208-10.
260. Id. at 1206.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1206 n.2 (citing Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1978)). In
addition to reducing the award by the amount of income tax on the lost earnings, the court
indicated that the trial court should consider increasing the award to reflect taxes that
would have to be paid on the income earned from investing the lump sum damage award.
Id. at 1206.
263. Id. at 1208.
264. Id.
265. Id. The court also rejected in a similar fashion the government's argument that the
$1,000,000 award to each parent for loss of their child's love and companionship was so large
as to be punitive. The court stated: "We find little reason to believe that a state will mis-
characterize an element of damages as compensatory simply to enable plaintiffs suing under
the FTCA to avoid the federal bar against punitive awards." Id. at 1209-10. The court
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Shaw represents a forceful rejection of the expansive definition
of "punitive damages" under the FTCA as any award exceeding a
plaintiff's actual loss. Because the court in Shaw did not expressly
overrule cases such as Felder, however, the idiosyncratic federal
definition continues in effect in the Ninth Circuit with respect to
such issues as the deduction of income taxes from lost earnings
awards and the discounting of these awards to present value.
Thus, among the federal circuit courts that have considered the
issue, only the Third Circuit26 and the Sixth Circuit 267 have inter-
preted the punitive damages ban correctly, defining "punitive
damages" as damages awarded separately, in addition to compen-
satory damages, for purposes of punishment and deterrence in
cases of aggravated misconduct. The Ninth Circuit seems to have
adopted the view of the Sixth Circuit,26 8 but it has left standing a
line of cases reflecting its earlier, incorrect approach.2 9 The
First,270 Fourth,271 and Fifth272 Circuits have defined punitive dam-
ages unequivocally as any damages beyond a plaintiff's actual loss,
as determined by the federal court, without regard to the ordinary
punitive damage concepts of aggravated misconduct, punishment,
and deterrence.
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United
States in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, it intended to have
the district courts determine issues of liability and damages in ac-
cordance with state law so that plaintiffs injured by the
proceeded to reduce the award of non-pecuniary damages, but it did so by finding that the
award was excessive as a matter of state law. See id. at 1210.
266. See Barnes v. United States, 685 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1982); supra notes 230 & 232;
Smith v. United States, 587 F:2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1978); supra notes 254 & 255.
267. See Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1978); supra notes 209-17 and
accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 181-208 & 227-36 and accompanying text.
270. See D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075
(1973); supra notes 160-80 and accompanying text.
271. See Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1226 (1984); supra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
272. See Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1982); supra notes 218-26 and
accompanying text; Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969); supra notes 153-59
and accompanying text.
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government would fare as well as other tort plaintiffs suing in the
same state. The use of state law to determine the scope of the pu-
nitive damages ban under the FTCA would be entirely consistent
with that congressional intent. A federal definition should apply
only to invalidate state definitions that are aberrational or con-
trary to the purposes of the FTCA. The legislative history of the
FTCA does not indicate any congressional intent to depart from
the various state measures of compensatory damages, and the his-
tory is entirely consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of
the term "punitive damages." The federal definition applied in a
majority of the circuits that have considered the question, on the
other hand, flies in the face of this plain and ordinary meaning.
Their definition makes no reference to aggravated misconduct,
punishment, or deterrence, and it compels the courts to create a
federal measure of "actual" compensatory damages under the
FTCA.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court passed up the opportunity to
rectify this misinterpretation when it denied the plaintiff's petition
for certiorari in Flannery v. United States.273 With such large
sums of money at stake, however, litigants undoubtedly will con-
tinue to press their claims until the Supreme Court resolves the
split among the circuits. As this Article demonstrates, the correct
resolution of this issue seems eminently clear.
273. 467 U.S. 1226 (1984), denying cert. to 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983); see also 52
U.S.L.W. 3867 (U.S. May 29, 1984) (No. 83-1572) (summarizing issues in the petition for
certiorari).
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